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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
I Background 
This research is contextualised in the maritime domain, where since the introduction of 
legislation mandating the carriage of Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems 
(ECDIS) by merchant vessels, evidence has emerged of unintended consequences of this 
legislation – which threaten the safety of navigation.  
Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) V/19 
which came into force in 2011 mandated the carriage of ECDIS for ships on international 
voyages flying the flag of contracting states.1  ECDIS carriage thus became compulsory for 
different vessel types and sizes on a rolling basis that began in 2012 and will be complete in 
mid-2018.2 For ECDIS to meet SOLAS carriage requirements, ships must have a back-up 
system in place, which may be a second ECDIS.3 There is thus an increasing percentage of the 
world’s fleet that no longer carries paper charts and has transitioned to ‘paperless’ navigation 
using electronic charts, marking a fundamental change in the way that vessels navigate.  
Despite an apparently robust legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS for safe 
navigation, the terms ‘ECDIS-assisted accidents’ and ‘ECDIS-assisted groundings’ have of late 
become part of maritime terminology.4 In recent years, marine accident investigation reports 
have increasingly identified the failure of bridge watchkeepers to use ECDIS properly as a 
causal factor in vessel groundings.5 Yet the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)’s 
performance standards for ECDIS state: ‘The primary function of the ECDIS is to contribute to 
safe navigation’.6 The real-time presentation of information displayed by ECDIS should 
improve officers’ cognitive assessment of their navigational situation. Why, then, are these 
‘ECDIS-assisted accidents’ occurring?  
                                                 
1 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended V/19 2.10. The first version 
of SOLAS was adopted in 1914; the current version was adopted in 1974 and entered into force in 1980. See 
http://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-safety-of-life-
at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx and http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx, accessed on 
31/01/2018.  
2 Ibid. 
3 IMO Resolution MSC.232(82) ‘Adoption of the Revised Performance Standards for ECDIS’ (2006). 
4 Nielsen, Mads Ragnvald How a Ship´s Bridge Knows its Position – ECDIS Assisted Accidents from a 
Contemporary Human Factors Perspective (unpublished MSc thesis, Lund University, 2016) 10 available 
at  http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8895474, accessed on 24/01/2018 (Nielsen). 
5 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (UK) Rep.24/2014 Report on the investigation of the grounding 
of Ovit in the Dover Strait on 18 September 2013 (2014); MAIB Rep.22/2017 Report on the investigation of the 
grounding of Muros Haisborough Sand North Sea 3 December 2016 (2017).  
6 IMO MSC.232(82). 
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Although shortcomings in ECDIS design have been identified, it appears that the problem 
is less with the technology, and more with the operators – and their lack of sufficient training 
in the use of ECDIS. ECDIS and associated integrated (highly automated) navigational bridge 
systems are increasingly complex, and deck officers require adequate training to be able to use 
them correctly and safely. Crucially, navigators must fully comprehend and appreciate the 
limitations of electronic aids to navigation and integrated systems. When officers have blind 
faith in ECDIS without fully understanding its operational restrictions, dangerous bridge 
watchkeeping practices emerge. Overreliance has been identified as a primary risk in the use of 
ECDIS, as it significantly reduces navigational safety. 
 
II Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this dissertation is to present an analysis of the factors inhibiting ECDIS from 
effectually achieving its intended primary function of contributing to safe navigation. Four 
research objectives were identified as being key in facilitating the achievement of the overall 
research aim. First, to identify applicable legislation and scrutinise the efficacy of the current 
legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS. The research is thus contextualised within the 
lex lata, the effectiveness of which is then assessed.  Secondly, to analyse the potentially unsafe 
technical operational aspects and limitations of ECDIS. Thirdly, to critically evaluate the 
human factor and human error in the use of ECDIS. Collectively, these two objectives present 
the challenges in the use of ECDIS from a technical and a human factors perspective. The fourth 
research objective is to outline current industry initiatives to improve the safety of navigation 
with ECDIS, and consider additional measures to mitigate unsafe practices in the use of ECDIS 
by deck officers. Ways to enhance future navigational safety with ECDIS are thus 
contemplated. 
 
III Research Focus and Dissertation Structure 
This research adds value to an area of concern in the shipping industry that is both topical and 
urgent. The international commercial fleet of merchant vessels – carrying ninety percent of the 
world’s trade7 – is currently being navigated by deck officers who are not all competent in the 
safe use of their primary means of navigation. Evidence of this is presented in the case studies 
                                                 
7 International Chamber of Shipping ‘Shipping Facts’ available at http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-
facts/shipping-and-world-trade accessed on 24/01/2018. 
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and commentaries included in this dissertation, and the author’s own insight from experience 
gained while working at sea and while teaching ECDIS training courses is also drawn upon. 
Although the Manila Amendments8 updated the STCW9 Code to include a requirement 
for training in ECDIS by deck officers, the revisions did not go far enough in addressing the 
need for comprehensive instruction in a navigational system fundamentally different to the use 
of paper charts. ECDIS training has not been sufficiently integrated into the STCW framework 
and express provisions mandating how ECDIS should be used as an aid to navigation in 
maintaining a safe watch are inadequate. Recent research aimed at informing future ECDIS 
design investigated officers’ experience with ECDIS and found that ‘current ECDIS training 
regimes themselves could be another pertinent research area’.10  
Dangerous trends of overreliance on ECDIS – including complacency in the execution 
of traditional bridge watchkeeping duties to ensure the safety of navigation – are increasingly 
common on modern bridges, particularly amongst the younger generation of deck officers.11 
Traditional navigation routines have largely been replaced with less interactive, less tactile 
watchkeeping practices. Monitoring the ship’s satellite-derived position displayed on a 
computer screen on the bridge does not require watchkeeping officers to engage with their 
surroundings to the same degree and can result in a lack of situational awareness. 
A challenge faced by stakeholders in the maritime industry is to ensure that legislation 
can keep up with technological developments in navigation systems. In an industry that has 
historically been reactive rather than proactive in enacting legislative reform to ensure the safety 
of maritime operations,12 this is a cause for concern.  
                                                 
8 The Manila Amendments marked a major revision and were adopted in 2010. See 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Documents/32.pdf accessed on 
31/01/2018. The amendments entered into force in 2012 under the tacit acceptance procedure, with a five-year 
transitional period until 01/01/2017. See IMO STCW.7/Circ.16 ‘Clarification of Transitional Provisions relating 
to the 2010 Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention and Code’ (2011).  
9 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 
Code) was adopted in 1978 and entered into force in 1984.  
See http://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-on-standards-of-
training,-certification-and-watchkeeping-for-seafarers-(stcw).aspx accessed on 31/01/2018.  
10 Nielsen 57.  
11 See the case studies and accident reports referenced in this dissertation (Chapters 2/III, 3/III/e, 3/IV/b,d, 3/V/i). 
12 The first version of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adopted in 1914, in 
reaction to the Titanic disaster  
(see http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Pages/default.aspx);  
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was adopted in response to a 
series of tanker accidents in 1976-7  
(see http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-
Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx);  
the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (the ISM Code) 
developed in response to, inter alia, the Herald of Free Enterprise tragedy in 1987 (see 
10 
The structure of this dissertation is based on the research objectives identified to assist 
in achieving the overall research aim of presenting an analysis of the factors inhibiting ECDIS 
from effectually achieving its intended primary function of contributing to safe navigation. 
Chapter 1 contextualises this research and identifies the research aim and individual research 
objectives. The research focus is discussed and justified, and the structure of the dissertation is 
outlined. In Chapter 2, applicable legislation is identified and case studies are used to scrutinise 
the efficacy of the current legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS. Potential legal 
implications for the use of ECDIS are also briefly considered. An analysis of the potentially 
unsafe technical operational aspects and limitations of ECDIS is presented in Chapter 3. The 
dangers of overreliance are illustrated by reviewing the importance of (inter alia) appropriate 
user settings, the accuracy of charts and positional information; and through the use of case 
studies. Chapter 4 consists of a critical evaluation of the human factor and human error in the 
use of ECDIS, cognisant of the reality that most maritime casualties are caused by human error. 
Considerations include types of human error, error management, the effects of automation on 
human performance (and decision-making) and safety management. In Chapter 5, current 
industry initiatives to improve the safety of navigation with ECDIS are outlined, which mostly 
focus on human-centred design considerations and the standardisation of systems. Additional 
measures to mitigate unsafe practices in the use of ECDIS by deck officers are then considered 
– primarily officer training concerns – and it is found that ECDIS training has not been 
sufficiently integrated into the STCW framework. Chapter 6 concludes that despite an 
apparently robust legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS, the current legislative 
provisions do not appear to be effective in preventing ECDIS-assisted accidents; and the current 
ECDIS training mandated by the STCW Code does not appear to be adequate to ensure officers’ 
competence in its use for safe navigation. 
 
  
                                                 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/SafetyManagement/Pages/Default.aspx) all accessed on 
24/01/2018. 
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CHAPTER 2 APPLICABLE LEGISLATION AND THE EFFICACY OF THE 
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE USE OF ECDIS 
I Introduction 
Despite an apparently robust legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS for safe navigation, 
ECDIS-assisted maritime casualties continue to occur. In many of these incidents, the vessels 
and their crews were fully compliant with applicable international legislation – raising 
concerning questions for shipping safety in an increasingly technologically-dependent industry. 
The objective of this chapter is to identify applicable legislation and, through the use of case 
studies, to scrutinise the efficacy of the current legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS. 
Potential legal implications for the use of ECDIS are also briefly considered. 
 
II Overview of Applicable Legislation 
(a) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended 
The SOLAS Convention is widely regarded as the core international treaty regulating the safety 
of merchant ships.13 Chapter V of SOLAS covers the safety of navigation, and the definition of 
‘nautical chart or nautical publication’ in regulation V/2.2 has been updated to:  
‘a special-purpose map or book, or specially compiled database from which such a map or 
book is derived, that is issued officially by or on the authority of a Government, authorized 
Hydrographic Office or other relevant government institution and is designed to meet the 
requirements of marine navigation’. (author’s emphasis)  
The mandatory carriage of ECDIS as required by SOLAS regulation V19/2.10 is subject 
to a staged entry into force between 2012 and 2018.14 By July 2018, all cargo vessels greater 
than 10 000 gross tonnage (gt) must be equipped with ECDIS. For ECDIS to satisfy carriage 
requirements, it must meet certain specifications. The ECDIS must be type-approved and meet 
IMO performance standards.15 The charts used by the ECDIS must be official, up-to-date 
Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs) and the system must be maintained to ensure 
                                                 
13 See http://www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-for-the-safety-
of-life-at-sea-(solas),-1974.aspx, accessed on 24/01/2018. 
14 IMO MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev1 ‘ECDIS – Guidance for Good Practice’ (2017). 
15 MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev1 states: ‘According to SOLAS regulation V/18, ECDIS units onboard ships must be type-
approved. Type approval is the certification process that ECDIS equipment must undergo before it can be 
considered as complying with IMO performance standards. The process is carried out by flag Administration-
accredited type-approval organizations or marine classification societies in accordance with the relevant test 
standards developed by, inter alia, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (e.g. IEC 61174).’   
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compatibility with the latest IHO standards.16 There must also be an adequate, independent 
back-up arrangement in place for the ECDIS.17  
The purpose of the back-up system is to ensure that the safety of navigation is not 
compromised in the event of an ECDIS failure18 and it must provide for the ship to be safely 
navigated for the rest of the voyage. If the back-up is a second compliant19 ECDIS, it must be 
connected to an independent position-fixing system20 and have an independent power supply. 
An up-to-date folio of paper charts for the intended voyage also meets back-up requirements, 
although many companies are moving away from this option due to convenience and economic 
considerations.21 In addition to SOLAS, ECDIS back-up systems must comply with flag state 
requirements.  
SOLAS regulation V/9 (Hydrographic services) requires contracting governments to 
execute hydrographic surveys and prepare, issue and update nautical charts. International 
uniformity in charts must be ensured, based on the relevant resolutions and recommendations 
of the International Hydrographic Office (IHO). Regulation V/27 requires all nautical charts 
necessary for the intended voyage to be adequate and up-to-date.  
(b) International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended 
The primary purpose of the STCW Convention is to promote the safety of life and property at 
sea and the protection of the marine environment, by establishing international standards for 
seafarer training, certification and watchkeeping.22 The regulations in the Convention contain 
basic requirements, which are supported by sections in the Code, where these requirements are 
explained and elaborated.23 Part A of the Code is mandatory and contains the minimum 
standards of competence for seafarers, detailed in a sequence of tables. Part B is not mandatory, 
but contains recommended guidance in the implementation of the Convention.24 The Manila 
Amendments to the STCW Convention and Code were adopted in 2010 and entered into force 
                                                 
16 MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev1. 
17 Ibid; IMO MSC82/24 ‘Revised Performance Standards for ECDIS’ 1.2 (2006). 
18 MSC82/24 Appendix 6 – Back-Up Requirements. 
19 Meets performance standards and carriage requirements. 
20 A separate GPS unit to that used by the primary ECDIS.  
21 The PAYS (Pay as You Sail) option for chart licencing offered by many ENC suppliers allows vessels to only 
pay for the charts they actively use on the ECDIS, which can result in significant cost savings. A world folio of 
charts is passively installed on the ECDIS and can be accessed if the vessel’s port of destination changes during 
the voyage.    





in 2012, with a transitional period until 2017.25 Amongst the significant changes adopted in the 
Manila Amendments were new requirements regarding training in modern technology, 
including ECDIS. The STCW Code also contains general provisions for training and 
assessment,26 quality standards27 and standards governing the use of simulators.28  
Chapter VIII of the STCW Code contains general standards regarding watchkeeping. 
Requirements in Part 2 (voyage planning) include that the intended voyage be planned in 
advance and that the master ensures that the intended route is planned using adequate, 
appropriate charts containing,  
‘accurate, complete and up-to-date information regarding those navigational limitations 
and hazards which are of a permanent or predictable nature and which are relevant to the 
safe navigation of the ship’.29  
Once the planned route has been verified, it must be clearly displayed on appropriate 
charts and continuously available to the officer of the watch (OOW), who is required to verify 
each course to be followed before utilising it.30 Should it be necessary to deviate from the 
planned route, an amended route must be planned before deviating.31 
Part 3 sets out general watchkeeping principles, including the requirement to consider any 
limitations in qualifications when deploying watchkeeping personnel. Watchkeepers are 
required to make the most effective use of available resources, including information, 
installations and equipment. Watchkeeping personnel must also understand the functions and 
operation of equipment and be familiar with handling it, as well as know how to respond to 
information from this equipment.32 
Watchkeeping at sea is covered by Part 4, which states that officers are responsible for 
safely navigating the ship and should be particularly concerned with avoiding collision and 
stranding.33 Officers are required to maintain a proper lookout at all times, in compliance with 
Rule 5 of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). 
While performing the navigational watch, the vessel’s position must be ‘checked at sufficiently 
frequent intervals, using any available navigational aids necessary’.34 The OOW is required to 
                                                 
25 See STCW.7/Circ.16. 
26 Part A, Section A-I/6. 
27 Ibid A-I/8. 
28 Ibid A-I/12. 
29 STCW Code Chapter VIII Part 2.5. 
30 Ibid 2.6. 
31 Ibid 2.7. 
32 Ibid Part 3, 8.2-6. 
33 Ibid Part 4.10. 
34 Ibid 4.25. 
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fully comprehend the operation of all navigational equipment and be aware of its limitations,35 
and must use each of the electronic navigational aids as and when appropriate.36 
Part A, Chapter II of the STCW Code contains standards regarding the master and deck 
department. Section A-II/1 sets out the mandatory minimum requirements for certification of 
officers in charge of a navigational watch on ships of 500gt or above, with the specific 
competencies to be demonstrated listed in Table A-II/1 (navigation at operational level).  The 
ECDIS-related competency required at the operational level is for candidates to demonstrate 
proficiency in the use of ECDIS to maintain the safety of navigation. This includes a knowledge 
of the limitations of ECDIS and the dangers of overreliance, as well as familiarity with the 
functions required by the performance standards. Requirements for proficiency in the operation, 
interpretation and analysis of information obtained from ECDIS are detailed, including user 
settings, alarm parameters and integrated systems. Situational awareness while using ECDIS 
and confirmation of the ship's position by alternative means must be demonstrated. 
Section A-II/2 sets out the mandatory minimum requirements for certification of masters 
and chief mates in charge of a navigational watch on ships of 500gt or above, with the specific 
competencies to be demonstrated listed in Table A-II/2 (navigation at management level). 
Senior officers are required to be competent in determining the vessel's position and the 
accuracy of the resultant positional fix by any means, including modern electronic navigational 
aids – with specific knowledge of their operation, limitations, error sources, detection of 
misrepresentation of information and methods of correction. Errors affecting the accuracy of 
positions derived from electronic aids to navigation must be understood and methods to 
minimise the errors properly applied. The primary method selected for position fixing must be 
the most appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions. Knowledge of the 
interrelationship and optimum use of all available navigational data must be demonstrated. 
Senior officers are required to be proficient in maintaining the safety of navigation through the 
use of ECDIS and associated navigation systems to assist command decision-making. In this 
regard, actions must be taken to minimise risks to the safety of navigation. In addition, 
operational procedures for using ECDIS must be established, applied and monitored. 
Although these tables set out specific competencies in the use of ECDIS – these are for 
certification purposes only. Section 4.1 of Part A regarding principles to be observed in keeping 
a navigational watch only contains two provisions relating specifically to ECDIS. First, the use 
                                                 
35 Ibid 4.26. 
36 Ibid 4.36. 
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and operational condition of aids to navigation including ECDIS and other equipment affecting 
safe navigation are amongst the factors to be considered when deciding the composition of the 
bridge watch.37 Secondly, 4.47 states:  
‘When using ECDIS, appropriate usage code (scale) electronic navigational charts shall be 
used and the ship’s position shall be checked by an independent means of position fixing 
at appropriate intervals.’ 
Part B of the STCW Code contains extensive guidance regarding the use of simulators 
for training and assessment of competency,38 including for the operational use of ECDIS.39 Part 
B is not, however, mandatory.   
The IMO developed a series of model training courses to assist in the implementation of 
the STCW Code, although the courses are flexible in application.40 IMO Model Course 1.27 
(Operational Use of ECDIS) is intended to provide the knowledge, skill and comprehension of 
ECDIS required to safely navigate ships whose primary means of navigation is ECDIS.41 The 
course was designed to meet the STCW requirements in the use of ECDIS, as revised by the 
Manila Amendments.42 The generic course must be accredited by the flag state – in South 
Africa, this is regulated by the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA)’s SA 
Maritime Qualifications Code in GOP-531.16: Guidance Note, Deck: Generic ECDIS Training.    
The responsibilities of companies are outlined in Section A-I/14 of Part A of the STCW 
Code. Companies are required to provide written instructions to their ships, detailing the 
policies and procedures to be followed to ensure that newly employed seafarers are,  
‘given a reasonable opportunity to become familiar with the shipboard equipment, 
operating procedures and other arrangements needed for the proper performance of their 
duties, before being assigned to those duties.’43  
These policies must include the allocation of time for familiarisation with ship-specific 
watchkeeping and safety procedures.44 This familiarisation requirement should be considered 
with the similar provisions in the ISM Code. 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid 4.18.4. 
38 Section B-I/12.  
39 B-I/12.36-66. 
40 See http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/ModelCourses.aspx, 
accessed on 24/01/2018. 
41 IMO Model Course 1.27. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Section A-I/14.2. 
44 Ibid. 
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(c) The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention (International Safety Management [ISM] Code)  
The ISM Code45 provides a standard for the safe management and operation of ships and 
establishes safety management objectives. The duties of the company46 are clearly defined in 
the Code – to establish a Safety Management System (SMS) and to implement a policy for 
achieving the safety management objectives. The master’s responsibilities include 
implementation of the safety policy and fostering a safety culture onboard;47 and the company 
is required to provide adequate resources to support him/her.48 The SMS must ensure 
compliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and take account of codes, guidelines and 
standards recommended by the IMO, Administrations, classification societies and marine 
industry organisations.49 Administrations are responsible for verifying compliance with the 
requirements of the ISM Code and issuing associated certificates.50   
The SMS must include instructions and procedures to ensure the safe operation of 
vessels,51 often contained in a ship-specific Safety Management Manual (SMM). The SMS 
must include practical guidance on navigational safety, including procedures for the use of 
ECDIS that incorporate, inter alia, chart and software updates.52 The ISM Code requires the 
company to establish procedures to ensure that new personnel are given proper familiarisation 
with their duties,53 which includes familiarisation with ECDIS equipment for deck officers. 
This familiarisation training is achieved by type-specific ECDIS training courses which 
officers must attend before using the ECDIS equipment onboard for navigation. Type-specific 
training is not mandated by the STCW Code, but it is an ISM Code requirement. 
(d) International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), 1972 
The COLREGs entered into force in 1977 and apply to all vessels.54 The requirements 
concerning lookout are covered in Rule 5, which states:  
                                                 
45 The ISM Code was adopted by the IMO by Resolution A.741(18) in 1993 and became mandatory when SOLAS 
Chapter IX (Management for the safe operation of ships) entered into force in 1998. See 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Regulations/Documents/SOLAS98final.pdf accessed on 31/01/2018.  
46 Defined in the Code (A1.1.2) as the ship-owner or any organization or person, such as the manager or bareboat 
charterer, who has assumed responsibility for operating the ship.  
47 ISM Code A5. 
48 Ibid A6. 
49 Ibid A1.2.3. 
50 Documents of Compliance (companies); Safety Management Certificates (ships). 
51 ISM Code A1.4.2. 
52 International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) Bridge Procedures Guide 5ed (2016) (ICS BPG). 
53 ISM Code A6.3. 
54 COLREGs A.1. 
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‘Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as 
by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to 
make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.’ 
(e) Flag State Requirements 
Flag states are required to effectively exercise their jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over vessels under their flag.55 Before registration on their flag and 
thereafter at appropriate intervals, states must ensure that ships have the charts and navigational 
equipment onboard that are required for safe navigation.56 To ensure the safety at sea of vessels 
flying their flag, states must enforce compliance with applicable international regulations, 
including those relating to seaworthiness, equipment and crew training.57  
Generic and type-specific ECDIS training, as well as ECDIS back-up arrangements, are 
mandated (inter alia) by flag states. Discrepancies identified in these areas are discussed later 
in this dissertation.    
(f) Port State Control 
Although the primary responsibility for the safe operation of vessels lies with flag states and 
shipowners, Port State Control (PSC) has proven to be an effective regime for policing 
compliance with international maritime safety instruments.58 The concept of PSC was 
introduced by the IMO through the STCW Convention, as Article X compels parties to apply 
the STCW requirements to all vessels calling at their ports. The IMO promoted a regional 
approach to PSC inspections to increase efficiency,59 and nine regional MoUs60 on PSC 
inspections currently exist.  
Ships being detained during PSC inspections due to evidence of the improper and unsafe 
use of ECDIS onboard is becoming an increasingly frequent occurrence.61 Between 2001 and 
2017, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) executed eighty-seven ECDIS-related 
vessel detentions, with most of the deficiencies relating to the ISM systems onboard (including 
officers being unfamiliar with ECDIS operation) or equipment being defective, unofficial or 
                                                 
55 Part VII Art 94.1of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982, 
entered into force in 1994; Hare, John Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2ed (2009) ss6-4.1 
(Hare). 
56 UNCLOS Art94.4a. 
57 Ibid Art9.4. 
58 Hare ss6-4.2. 
59 See http://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/msas/pages/portstatecontrol.aspx, accessed on 24/01/2018.  
60 Memorandum of Understanding. 
61 Wingrove, Martyn ‘Rise in ships detained for ECDIS deficiencies’ (2016) available at 
http://www.marinemec.com/news/view,rise-in-ships-detained-for-ecdis-deficiencies_43571.htm, accessed on 
24/01/2018. 
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unapproved for navigation.62 AMSA detained eight vessels in the first five months of 2016 for 
ECDIS-related deficiencies, which was double the amount in the second half of 2015.63 
(g) Technical Specifications: IMO Performance Standards, International Hydrographic 
Organisation (IHO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)   
To meet the chart carriage requirements of SOLAS, ECDIS equipment must conform to the 
relevant IMO performance standards. Depending on the date of the shipboard installation of the 
ECDIS unit, it must comply with either IMO Resolution A.817(19), or Resolution 
MSC.232(82).64 
Relevant IHO standards specify the requirements for the presentation, structure and 
format of chart data (including encryption).65 The IHO S-52 standard ensures that the 
presentation of data on ECDIS screens is displayed in a uniform manner by all manufacturers, 
including colours and chart symbols. IHO S-57 defines the requirements for the construction of 
ENCs by hydrographic offices to ensure that all information required for safe navigation is 
contained therein, and specifies the data format for the transfer of digital hydrographic 
information. IHO S-63 ensures the authenticity of ENC data and contains provisions for security 
and piracy protection.66 
The IEC imposes standards concerning technical specifications for shipborne electronic 
navigational aids and radio equipment, the most pertinent of which is the IEC Publication 
61174: ‘ECDIS – Operational and Performance Requirements, Method of Testing and Required 
Test Results’. 
 
III Case Studies 
The peril of ECDIS-assisted groundings of vessels that are compliant with international 
legislation regulating the use of ECDIS is illustrated in the following three case studies. 
(a) Ovit 
The chemical tanker Ovit ran aground on the Varne Bank in the Dover Strait in 2013. ECDIS 
was the primary means of navigation onboard and no paper charts were carried.67 The Ovit 
complied with all applicable legislation for the use of ECDIS and was subject to regular audits, 
                                                 
62 The Nautical Institute & the Royal Institute of Navigation ‘Know you ECDIS – or risk detention’ (2017) Issue 
14 The Navigator 8. 
63 Wingrove op cit.  
64 MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev1. 
65 MSC.232(82). 
66 A full list of current IHO standards is maintained at https://www.iho.int/mtg_docs/enc/ECDIS-
ENC_StdsIn_Force.htm, accessed on 24/01/2018.  
67 MAIB Rep.24/2014 42. 
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yet the master and deck officers were unable to use the system effectively68 to ensure the safety 
of navigation. The Ovit’s deck officers’ ECDIS training satisfied the requirements of STCW 
and ISM,69 yet they were unaware of the importance of critical safety settings and the 
significance of the system’s alarms.70 The chart scale was inappropriate and the audible alarm 
not functional. A passage plan checklist included in the Ovit’s SMS had been completed, 
confirming that there were no routing hazards. The OOW was navigating by following the route 
shown on the vessel’s ECDIS display – which passed directly over the Varne Bank71 – and his 
situational awareness was so poor that it took him nineteen minutes to realise that the Ovit had 
grounded.72  
In 2013, the Ovit incident was the third grounding investigated by the United Kingdom’s 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) which identified deck officers’ failure to use 
ECDIS properly as a causal factor. The report concluded that the training which the ship’s 
officers attended was apparently either ineffective, or insufficient, or both. Design issues with 
the vessel’s ECDIS were also identified, as some key features were difficult to use. 
(b) CMA CGM Vasco de Gama 
In August 2016, the ultra-large container ship CMA CGM Vasco de Gama grounded while 
approaching Southampton. At the time, she was the largest vessel on the UK ship registry.73 
The primary means of navigation onboard was ECDIS, the master and deck officers had 
attended generic and type-specific ECDIS training courses.74 The vessel’s SMM included 
procedures for navigation with ECDIS and no non-conformities in navigation or bridge 
procedures had been identified during the last internal audit.75 Although the bridge team had 
completed checklists confirming that the ECDIS had been set up and was being used in 
accordance with company procedures, this was untrue.76 The MAIB investigation into the 
grounding found that safety parameters and alarms were not effectively used, selected display 
options were not optimally configured and that manoeuvres in the planned route were not 
possible given the characteristics of the large vessel and the environmental conditions. ECDIS 
                                                 
68 Ibid 2. 
69 Ibid 15, 46. 
70 Ibid 46. 
71 Ibid 2. 
72 Ibid. 
73 MAIB Rep.23/2017 Report on the investigation of the grounding of the ultra-large container vessel CMA CGM 
Vasco de Gama Thorn Channel, Southampton, England 22 August 2016 (2017) 1. 
74 Ibid 15. 
75 Ibid 16. 
76 Ibid 47. 
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was not being used effectively, or in accordance with company policy.77 The MAIB report 
states: 
‘Many of the procedural omissions and navigation shortcomings associated with the use of 
ECDIS seen in this case have been regularly identified by the MAIB in previous 
investigations. These issues need to be addressed globally by the maritime industry. There 
is a strong case for the commissioning of an industry-wide study into the reasons why 
masters and bridge teams are choosing not to use many of the safety features offered by 
modern electronic navigation aids.’78 
(c) Muros 
In December 2016, the bulk carrier Muros ran aground while following a planned track on the 
ECDIS which crossed Haisborough Sand. The system and procedural safeguards within the 
ECDIS – which are intended to prevent the vessel from grounding – were disabled, overlooked 
or ignored.79 The passage plan had been revised a few hours prior to the incident and had not 
been approved by the master (as required by the vessel’s SMM). The OOW had conducted a 
visual inspection of the revised track using a small scale chart which was not sufficient to 
identify the grounding hazard, and she ignored the warnings generated by the system’s 
automatic ‘check route’ function.  
The OOW monitored the vessel’s position solely by ECDIS, but the system’s alarms had 
been disabled.80 The officers deemed the absence of audible alarms advantageous and had not 
reported the deficiency.81 The MAIB report found that the lack of alarms and disabling of other 
safety features (designed to alert navigators to imminent hazards) within the ECDIS 
significantly reduced its intended advantage over paper charts. The master and deck officers 
had all received generic and type-specific ECDIS training.82 Internal and external audits had 
been conducted onboard earlier in the year, neither of which identified any non-conformities in 
navigation procedures.83 The ECDIS onboard was certified as SOLAS-compliant and the 
system installation met the IHO and IEC technical requirements.84 The MAIB report states:   
‘The MAIB has recently investigated several grounding incidents in which the way the 
vessels' ECDIS was configured and utilised was contributory. There is increasing evidence 
to suggest that first generation ECDIS systems were designed primarily to comply with the 
                                                 
77 Ibid 48. 
78 Ibid. 
79 MAIB Rep.22/2017 20. 
80 Ibid 1. 
81 Ibid 13. 
82 Ibid 10. 
83 Ibid 12. 
84 Ibid. 
21 
performance standards required by the IMO, as these systems became a mandatory 
requirement on ships, with insufficient attention being given to the needs of the end user. 
As a consequence, ECDIS systems are often not intuitive to use and lack the functionality 
needed to accommodate accurate passage planning in confined waters. This situation has 
led to seafarers using ECDIS in ways which are at variance with the instructions and 
guidance provided by the manufacturers and/or expected by regulators.’  
 
IV Efficacy of The Current Legal Framework Regulating the Use of ECDIS 
(a) Overview  
There appear to be three common safety-critical themes in these case studies: shortcomings in 
ECDIS design, inadequate officer training and the ineffectiveness of audits and inspections.  
(b) ECDIS Design 
Although the IMO performance standards provide general requirements for the technical 
operation of ECDIS, the details of how the system achieves these standards has been left up to 
individual manufacturers, resulting in significant disparities in functionality amongst ECDIS 
makes and models.85 Manufacturers tend to include additional features to give them a 
competitive edge or in an attempt to improve user-friendliness.86 Depending on the ECDIS in 
use, the procedures for accessing menus and executing basic operations are performed quite 
differently. Superfluous advanced features can saturate an ECDIS operator with unnecessary 
information87 and detract attention from the data required for safe navigation. 
Challenges faced by officers in the technical operation of ECDIS are described in Chapter 
3. Parties within the maritime industry have initiated measures to address the design and 
operational shortcomings identified within ECDIS, focusing on human-centred design and 
standardisation of systems.88 
(c) Officer Training 
To reduce crewing costs, many shipowners recruit officers from emerging economies where 
wage demands are lower. Different interpretations of international guidelines and inconsistent 
standards of training and education can exist due to the global nature of the maritime industry.89 
                                                 
85 Bell, Richard ‘ECDIS use onboard ship’ The Standard Club (2017) available at http://www.standard-
club.com/media/2533822/ecdis-use-on-board-ship.pdf accessed on 31/01/2018 (Bell).  
86 Squire, David ‘The Human Element in Shipping’ (2013) Alert! – The International Maritime Human Element 
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Even with the IMO’s international standards in place, officer training and assessment are not 
considered to be consistent globally, resulting in varied levels of competence.90 The STCW 
Code sets out the minimum standards of competency, and due to cost considerations most 
shipowners do not invest in additional training or education.91 As illustrated in the case studies, 
it appears that the STCW provisions for ECDIS training may not be sufficient to ensure officers’ 
competence in its use for safe navigation.  
Although the IMO’s model courses are intended to assist with the development of training 
programmes, they are not mandatory.92 Administrations are therefore not obliged to use them 
in the preparation and approval of training courses to meet STCW requirements,93 thereby 
further broadening the scope for varying interpretations by parties.   
A recent survey conducted by the Nautical Institute found that generic training courses 
improved the confidence of those using ECDIS, but there are some caveats on the quality of 
ECDIS training received.94 The survey identified discrepancies in the course delivery, duration, 
content and assessment methods.95 Courses required for STCW certification must be approved 
and accredited by the state’s maritime authority, and the lack of consistency indicates a 
worrying lack of international standards and uniformity regarding mandated training. In the 
case studies, the officers had completed generic ECDIS training but were not competent in the 
safe operation of the equipment onboard.  
The STCW Code contains provisions for certification requirements and for the use of 
simulators for ECDIS training, but does not adequately include express provisions mandating 
how ECDIS must be used as an aid to navigation in maintaining a safe watch. This research 
suggests that ECDIS training has not been sufficiently integrated into the STCW framework.96 
The IMO model course is generic in nature, covering the operation and limitations of 
ECDIS, but type-specific training in the unit used onboard is essential for competency in safe 
navigation with ECDIS. Bearing in mind their responsibility to provide familiarisation training 
as mandated by the ISM (and STCW) Code, the onus is on shipowners, operators or managers 
                                                 
90 Allianz Global Corporate & Speciality (in conjunction with the Seafarers International Research Centre of 
Cardiff University) ‘Safety and Shipping 1912 – 2012: From Titanic to Costa Concordia’ (2012) available at  
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94 Gale, Harry ‘Confidence in ECDIS’ (2017) 7 Seaways, The International Journal of The Nautical Institute 13-
14 (Gale). 
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to decide how the type-specific ECDIS training is delivered to their fleets’ officers.97 
Companies must ensure that they meet their flag state’s requirements for familiarisation 
training. Unfortunately, flag states have not adopted a uniform approach in addressing ECDIS 
familiarisation training, introducing further discrepancies in international standards.98  
Non-standardised displays and controls increase the training required for familiarisation 
with – and safe, effective use of – ECDIS equipment.99 Various options for methods of type-
specific training exist, including online courses, computer based training, shore based courses 
(run by ECDIS manufacturers or maritime training centres using simulators) and onboard 
training (conducted by manufacturers or training personnel).100 ‘Trickle-down’ or ‘cascade’ 
training – when an officer who has previously attended a familiarisation course gives newly-
joined officers a ‘crash course’ once onboard – is not considered sufficient and must not be 
accepted as adequate familiarisation training. ECDIS manufacturers’ equipment operating 
manuals can be difficult to follow due to their highly technical content, particularly if not 
written in the reader’s mother tongue,101 and are poor training tools.102  
Vessels within a company’s fleet may be equipped with different ECDIS models, and 
officers may thus require type-specific training from several manufacturers. The challenge 
faced by pilots is even greater, given the multitude of ECDIS types on the market. 
There is a strong argument for standardisation of both ECDIS systems and type-specific 
training requirements, as considered in Chapter 5.   
(d) Audits and Inspections 
There is no requirement in STCW for type-specific training in ECDIS, although regulation I/14 
compels companies to ensure familiarisation training with onboard equipment.103 Officers are 
therefore not required to provide documentation of type-specific ECDIS training,104 but must 
be able to demonstrate competence in the use of the equipment onboard during audits and 
inspections.  
Yet detailed navigational audits and inspections have failed to identify officers’ lack of 
competence in the use of ECDIS, as seen in the case studies. Given the significant latitude that 
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manufacturers were allowed in interpreting the operational functions of ECDIS, there is a great 
disparity in methods of accessing and verifying information within the system. With almost 
forty makes of ECDIS on the market, inspectors and surveyors may be unsure of how to 
effectively assess officer competence or whether the system is being used in accordance with 
safe navigational practices. An SMS containing provisions for the use of ECDIS is not evidence 
that officers are in fact complying with the stipulated procedures.    
While not practical to expect flag and port state inspectors, as well as class and 
independent surveyors, to have completed type-specific training for every model of ECDIS, 
action is clearly required to ensure that deficiencies in navigation with ECDIS are identified 
during audits and inspections. Administrations should inform their PSC Officers of ECDIS 
familiarisation training requirements as outlined in MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev1. Companies must 
be proactive in ensuring their internal ISM auditors are familiar with the ECDIS units in use 
across their fleets.   
 
V Potential Legal Implications for the Use of ECDIS 
The bulk carrier African Alke was detained in Brisbane in 2016 following a PSC inspection by 
AMSA, which found that the crew was unable to properly operate the vessel’s ECDIS. The 
crew were fully certified and the vessel’s SMS had not identified the failure of onboard 
familiarisation training as a deficiency. The vessel’s operator had to fly an ECDIS trainer in 
from Singapore to train the crew, and the charterer took the ship off hire while she was 
detained.105 
The legal effects of the failure to meet the extensive statutory ECDIS requirements, and 
the effect on claims if the standards of knowledge of ECDIS and its operation are a causal 
factor, are beyond the scope of this dissertation. There is, however, fertile ground for interesting 
further research in this field, and case law will no doubt develop as ECDIS-related casualties 
and detentions continue to occur. The UK P&I Club anticipates significant implications for the 
claims sector:  
‘With the requirement for effective training, familiarisation and operation now receiving 
increased focus, with traditional damage defences of navigational error, heavy weather and 
crew negligence now being subjected to additional scrutiny, the ECDIS revolution may be 
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available at https://fairplay.ihs.com/safety-regulation/article/4269111/australia-ship-detention-puts-spotlight-on-
ship-safety-management accessed on 31/01/2018. 
25 
the catalyst which sparks a new cycle in the claims sector and one which may be even more 
costly than the introduction of the technology itself.’106  
Consequences of failing to meet statutory requirements for the carriage and use of ECDIS 
may include vessel detention under PSC provisions, suspension of class, suspension of ISM 
certification and exclusion of liability for a breach related to failure to comply with H&M 
insurance requirements.107  
The recording capabilities of ECDIS and VDRs108 have seen the information from these 
sources become a key aspect of evidence in legal proceedings, often employed to ascertain 
disputed facts.109 Amendments to the procedural rules for admiralty claims in the English courts 
came into force in 2017, that encourage the early exchange of electronic track data in collision 
claims, to simplify proceedings and expedite determination of liability.110  
This capability to digitally reconstruct events preceding an incident has also streamlined 
and enhanced marine casualty investigations. However, as data recovery methods vary amongst 
ECDIS manufacturers, surveyors and investigators may face technically complex procedures 
to retrieve track recordings from some units.111 Given the legal importance of this data, the case 
for the standardisation of these ECDIS operational functions is strengthened.   
  
                                                 
106 UK P&I Club ‘ECDIS – Navigational and claims issues’ (2011) available at 
https://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/ECDIS%20-%20LP%20Supplement.pdf 
accessed on 31/01/2018. 
107 Ibid. 
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109 UK P&I Club op cit. 
110 The Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017 (SI 2017 No. 95 (L.1)); see 
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CHAPTER 3 POTENTIALLY UNSAFE TECHNICAL OPERATIONAL ASPECTS 
AND LIMITATIONS OF ECDIS 
I Introduction 
A fundamental difference between navigation by paper charts and electronic charts lies in how 
information is displayed. On paper charts, the cartographers compiling them determined how 
to present the information they felt that navigators required for safe navigation.112 In contrast, 
when using ENCs, it is the navigator who selects the information that is displayed from a 
database on the ECDIS system.113 The capability to tailor the chart to suit the particular 
navigational situation can enhance the safety of navigation, but only if the operator has an in-
depth understanding of which charted features are appropriate to include in various 
circumstances. If not adequately trained, navigators may omit crucial safety-related information 
from the ECDIS display, or use the system at a presentation scale which does not show all 
features required for safe navigation.  
The use of ECDIS is intended to reduce the navigational workload (compared to paper 
charts) as the vessel’s position is continuously plotted114 on the screen. The navigator must, 
however, always be cognisant of the fact that the displayed position is derived from GPS115 data 
and must be verified by other means. Frequent manual positions must still be plotted on 
electronic charts as they are on paper charts – using visual bearings and radar ranges and 
bearings during coastal navigation, and celestial fixes when deep-sea. Navigators’ overreliance 
on ECDIS significantly reduces the safety of navigation, as identified in case studies, and 
expressed by the International Chamber of Shipping: 
‘ECDIS is an aid to safe navigation. ECDIS does not conduct safe navigation or relieve the 
Master or OOW of their responsibilities for conducting safe navigation.’116 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the potentially unsafe technical operational 
aspects and limitations of ECDIS. The dangers of overreliance are illustrated by reviewing the 
importance of appropriate user settings, the accuracy of charts and positional information; and 
through the use of case studies.  
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II A Background of Technology-Assisted Maritime Casualties 
The inappropriate use of technology on ships’ bridges predates electronic charts and the 
tendency for navigators to over-rely on automated navigational aids is by no means unique to 
ECDIS. The increasingly widespread use of radar commenced in the 1950s and was anticipated 
to reduce the number of collisions by vessels at sea. Yet the first ‘radar assisted collision’ 
occurred in 1956 between the Andrea Doria and the Stockholm, with the loss of fifty-one lives 
due to the improper use of radar.117 Although radar technology is no longer new and radars have 
been commonplace on bridges for decades,118 ‘radar assisted collisions’ continue to occur. 
Over-confidence in the accuracy of the information provided by ARPA119 was identified as a 
causal factor in a collision between a container vessel and a yacht in 2003.120 The report into 
the incident also highlighted that the fitting of radar and ARPA equipment on vessels, without 
officers knowing its limitations or how to use it, can contribute to accidents.121 The term 
‘VHF122 assisted collisions’ has also emerged following investigation findings that in a 
significant number of collisions, one or both parties inappropriately used VHF radio in an 
attempt to avoid collision – instead of following the COLREGs.123 
The introduction of GPS as a positional aid revolutionised marine navigation, but as with 
any aid to navigation, it is not infallible. A notorious case of overreliance on GPS is the cruise 
ship Royal Majesty, which ran aground in 1995.124 Less than an hour after departure from 
Bermuda (bound for Boston), the vessel’s GPS antenna became disconnected and the GPS 
defaulted to DR (dead reckoning)125 mode. The resulting alarm was not heard on the bridge and 
for the next thirty-four hours none of the officers noticed that the GPS was operating in DR 
mode. Although (erroneous) GPS positions were being plotted on the chart, the navigators were 
not verifying these fixes by an independent means – a procedure required by safe bridge 
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watchkeeping practices and good seamanship. Due to their overreliance on GPS, by the time 
the Royal Majesty grounded she was seventeen miles from where the officers thought she 
was.126 
 
III ECDIS Operation 
(a) Electronic Chart Display Systems 
Electronic chart display systems include any electronic equipment that is capable of displaying 
a ship’s position superimposed on a chart image displayed on a computer screen.127 ECDIS is 
the first class of electronic chart display systems, which meets IMO/SOLAS carriage 
requirements. The second class is an Electronic Chart System (ECS) which does not meet 
carriage requirements, but may be used to assist navigation.128 There are a variety of privately 
produced ECS options, including handheld GPS units and smartphone navigation applications 
(‘apps’). It is important to distinguish these from ECDIS, as an ECS may not legally be used as 
a primary means of navigation. 
(b) Official and Unofficial Charts 
Official (electronic and paper) charts are issued by a Government or authorised Hydrographic 
Office129 and meet carriage requirements if they are kept up-to-date. All other charts are 
considered unofficial (private) charts and may not be used as a primary means of navigation, as 
they do not meet SOLAS legal requirements. Official electronic charts may be either vector 
charts (ENCs) or Raster Navigational Charts (RNCs). 
(c) Vector Charts  
When official ENCs are in use, ECDIS is operated in ‘normal’ ECDIS mode. ENCs conform 
to IHO standards130 regarding content, structure and format.131 ENCs are official vector charts 
and store hydrographic information in a database, rather than as a picture132 like traditional 
charts. The navigator can select the information and features from the database to display on 
the ECDIS screen.133 All information necessary for safe navigation is contained in ENCs, and 
                                                 
126 NTSB/MAR-97/01. 
127 IHO S-66 ‘Facts About Electronic Charts and Carriage Requirements’ 1.0.0ed (2010). 
128 Ibid. 
129 SOLAS V. 
130 IHO S-57. 
131 MSC.232(82). 
132 ICS BPG. 
133 ICS BPG 71. 
29 
they may contain additional data to that found on paper charts.134 Navigators can select layers 
of information to be displayed, as described in Chapter 3/V below.  
Charted features are attribute-encoded to IHO S-57 standards and can thus trigger 
alarms to draw officers’ attention to navigational hazards. ENCs can be interrogated by the user 
to gain additional information about objects displayed on the chart. Official vector charts are 
considered to have an ‘inherent intelligence’ in that charted features can be recognised by 
ECDIS. Positions on ENCs are referred to the World Geodetic System 1984 Datum 
(WGS84),135 making them directly compatible with GNSS136 positions. 
(d) Raster Charts 
It is also possible for ECDIS to be operated in Raster Chart Display System (RCDS) mode, 
when RNCs (official raster charts) are used in geographical areas where ENCs are not available. 
Although nearly worldwide coverage of ENCs now exists, the IMO warns that sufficiently 
detailed ENCs may not yet have been issued for some areas.137  
When an ECDIS is operated in RCDS mode, it must be used in conjunction with an 
appropriate folio of up-to-date paper charts, as it is not capable of performing full ECDIS 
functionality.138 However, IHO standards exist for the production of RNCs,139 and the IMO 
performance standards contain specifications for using ECDIS in RCDS mode.140  
Raster charts are simply scanned digital copies of paper charts, and therefore will not 
trigger automatic alarms. Raster charts cannot be customised to suit user preferences or be 
interrogated to gain additional information about charted objects. Some raster charts may not 
be referenced to WGS-84 and horizontal datums and chart projections may differ between 
RNCs.141   
(e) Case Studies – Unofficial Charts and/or Systems 
In 2016 the ro-ro ferry Petunia Seaways and the historic motor launch Peggotty collided on the 
River Humber while in dense fog, resulting in Peggotty sinking. Although Peggotty’s skipper 
was an off-duty pilot, the voyage was not conducted in accordance with safe navigational 
practices. An iPad navigation app was used as the primary means of navigation, which ceased 
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to function soon after departure when it lost a reliable wi-fi signal. This left Peggotty immersed 
in fog with no buoyage visible and caused the skipper to lose his situational awareness entirely. 
He failed to monitor the vessel’s position or other traffic effectively. The apparent functionality 
of the iPad app gave the Peggotty’s navigators false confidence in their ability to navigate safely 
in dense fog. However, they had not used the system before and no back-up arrangements, such 
as rigging the mast to use the radar, were considered.142  
While competing in the 2014/5 Volvo Ocean Race, the yacht Vestas Wind grounded on a 
shoal in the Indian Ocean. The main contributing factors were the inadequate use of electronic 
charts and deficient cartography in presenting navigational dangers at small scales on the ECS 
in use. The unofficial ECS in use on the yacht was inadequate for a primary means of 
navigation, as described above. On paper charts of every scale that cover the area, the hazard 
was clear.143  
In 2013, the general cargo vessel Danio ran aground off the English east coast, after the 
OOW fell asleep. Paper charts were the primary means of navigation onboard, but the vessel 
carried an ECS which did not meet SOLAS carriage requirements. The incident report found 
that the officers were over-reliant on the ECS for passage planning and watchkeeping.144 
In 2010, the Beluga Revolution ran aground in the South Pacific. In addition to the 
required navigational aids, the bridge was equipped with an ECS. The navigator had pre-
planned the voyage using the ECS, then transferred it to the paper charts. It was not noticed that 
the track nearly crossed over an island. A small scale chart was in use, which gave no warning 
or visual indication of the island. As raster charts were in use on the ECS, no alarms were 
triggered.145  
In 2004, the bulk carrier Rocknes grounded in Norway with a pilot onboard. Due to a 
cargo shift caused by the grounding, the vessel subsequently capsized and eighteen crew 
members died. Paper charts were the primary means of navigation onboard, but the pilot 
navigated using unofficial, out-of-date electronic charts. The hazard on which the Rocknes 
                                                 
142 MAIB Rep.4/2017 Collision between Petunia Seaways and Peggotty on the River Humber 19 May 2016 (2017). 
143 Oxenbould, Chris, Honey, Stan & Hawley, Chuck Volvo Ocean Race Independent Report into the Stranding of 
Vestas Wind 1.2 (2015). 
144 MAIB Rep.8/2014 Report on the investigation of the grounding of Danio off Longstone, Farne Islands, England 
16 March 2013 (2014). 
145 German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Rep.174/10 Grounding of the MV Beluga 
Revolution off Enus (Tench) Island in the South Seas on 30 April 2010 (2011). 
31 
grounded was shown on the updated charts produced the previous year, but not on the private, 
out-of-date electronic chart used by the pilot.146   
(f) ECDIS Anomalies 
An ECDIS anomaly is defined as ‘an unexpected or unintended behaviour of an ECDIS unit 
which may affect the use of the equipment or navigational decisions made by the user’.147 
Numerous ECDIS anomalies have been detected, and as the operation of the system comprises 
a complex combination of hardware, software and data – further anomalies may be 
anticipated.148 Anomalies that have been experienced in the use of ECDIS include failure to 
display navigational features correctly, failure to detect objects with the automated ‘route 
check’ function during passage planning, failure to alarm correctly and failure to manage 
several alarms correctly.149  
The existence of ECDIS anomalies can pose a serious threat to the safety of navigation, 
particularly for paperless vessels. To address this issue, the IHO created ‘data presentation and 
performance check’ datasets for ECDIS.150 Loading these test datasets onto their ECDIS allows 
navigators to ascertain if anomalies exist on their system and to evaluate its operating 
performance.151 The datasets also fulfil the testing requirements of the IEC 61174152 standard, 
which must be complied with to meet IMO performance standards. (To further address 
anomalies, the IHO has updated its ECDIS-related standards – see Chapter 5/I/b.) 
The test datasets should alert officers if their ECDIS software requires an update from the 
manufacturer.153 It is crucial that ECDIS software is maintained and thus capable of correctly 
displaying up-to-date ENCs in accordance with the latest versions of the IHO’s standards for 
chart content and display.154   
(g) Software Maintenance 
If ECDIS software is not updated to the latest version of IHO standards, the system may not 
meet the carriage requirements of SOLAS regulation V/19.2.1.4, which requires all vessels to 
have ‘nautical charts … to plan and display the ship’s route…’. ECDIS may not correctly 
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display the latest charted features if it has not been upgraded to ensure compatibility with the 
newest version of the IHO’s ENC Product Specification or Presentation Library,155 and might 
not sound appropriate alarms.156 It may also not be possible to install or load some ENCs if the 
system is not compliant with the current version of the IHO’s Data Protection Standard.157 The 
application software within ECDIS must therefore function entirely in accordance with IMO 
performance standards and be capable of correctly displaying all ENC data, to ensure the safety 
of navigation.158 
The IHO has recently updated their software standards – see Chapter 5/I/b. However, 
some older ECDIS units159 (the hardware component of the system) cannot be upgraded with 
new software, or experience difficulties when attempting to upgrade ECDIS software.160 Some 
vessels may thus be required to replace their ECDIS equipment, as the IMO’s performance 
standards state:  
‘The contents of the SENC161 should be adequate and up-to-date for the intended voyage 
to comply with regulation V/27 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention as amended.’162 
The IMO places an onus on manufacturers to ‘provide a mechanism to ensure software 
maintenance arrangements are adequate’; and on Administrations to  
‘inform shipowners and operators that proper ECDIS software maintenance is an important 
issue and that adequate measures need to be implemented by masters, shipowners and 
operators in accordance with the International Safety Management (ISM) Code’.163 
The procedures contained in the SMS for software updating must be adhered to by the 
responsible officers. ECDIS failure, non-availability of the system and subsequent delay to the 
vessel have resulted from failure to follow the correct procedures.164 The IHO’s test datasets 
should be run after each software update or ECDIS upgrade to ensure the system is functioning 
correctly.165 
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(h) Integrated Systems 
An Integrated Bridge System (IBS) is a combination of systems which are interconnected to 
allow centralised access to sensor information and control of navigational functions.166 IBSs 
are commonplace on modern merchant vessels, with ECDIS acting as the integrating 
component, tying together information from numerous sensors and inputs. IBSs typically 
comprise sensor inputs from the following sources: ECDIS, GNSS positional information, 
AIS,167 BNWAS,168 radar and ARPA, gyro compass, heading and track control, speed log, echo 
sounder, GMDSS169 communications, propulsion and steering monitoring and control, as well 
as cargo operations and security systems.170   
Although the aim of an IBS is to increase safe and efficient vessel management,171 
watchkeeping officers must take account of system limitations. Navigators may become 
overloaded by information from so many sources and distracted from their primary duties for 
safe navigation. In addition, inaccurate or erroneous information from any one sensor will 
transmit to all parts of the system, which could affect calculations for such things as ETAs172 
and CPAs. It is essential that officers maintain an awareness of the limitations of all electronic 
aids to navigation that form part of an IBS, so that errors may be promptly recognised. The 
prudent navigator will verify all information displayed on the ECDIS screen, regardless of its 
sensor origin. 
(i) Cyber Security 
Malware is increasingly being detected onboard vessels, posing a considerable safety threat to 
IBSs and shipboard operations. The use of ECDIS presents significant cyber security risks, as 
many units are run on older, unsupported operating systems. There have been instances where 
ECDIS systems have been taken offline due to crew members attempting to charge cell phones 
on the ECDIS computers. When the ECDIS attempts to locate the drivers for the phone and 
cannot find them, the system crashes. As many are running XP (vulnerable as it is unsupported) 
with poor quality software, the systems are not easy to recover.173   
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Companies must ensure that there are clear procedures in place to prevent this type of 
incident, and onboard management must enforce strict compliance. (The simple act of blocking 
the USB ports on the ECDIS computers onboard seems a logical step.) In addition to 
procedures, information regarding the vulnerabilities of ECDIS systems should be incorporated 
into formal shore-based training and onboard safety training.  
 
IV ECDIS Accuracy 
(a) Chart Accuracy 
The depth and positional information on charts is based on hydrographic surveys which were 
conducted employing the methods and position-fixing technology available at the time.174 For 
older surveys, the positional accuracy was not as precise as modern systems allow. A vessel 
navigating with GNSS may thus know its position with better accuracy than that of charted 
features.175 Navigators must heed the limitations of chart accuracy – guidance for best practice 
is available from the IMO.176 
High-resolution electronic charts may provide a deceptive impression of increased 
accuracy, but are based on the same hydrographic survey data used in the compilation of paper 
charts. Consequently, when passage planning with ECDIS, navigators must employ the 
CATZOC177 function to assess the reliability of the source data and its associated accuracy – 
and thus determine the level of risk for navigation in that area. The ‘pick report’ facility may 
also be used to access more detailed information about the chart in use (including the year and 
type of survey).     
(b) Case Studies – Chart Accuracy  
In 2016, the freighter Nova Cura was declared a total loss after running aground on a reef in 
the Aegean Sea whose position was incorrectly shown on the ENC in use on the ECDIS. The 
officers had completed generic ECDIS training but were unfamiliar with the CATZOC 
function, which had thus not been used during route planning. This omission resulted in the 
navigators being unaware of the poor reliability of the ENC’s survey data.178  
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The minesweeper USS Guardian grounded on a reef in the Philippines in 2013. A US 
Navy review found that the officers over-relied on an inaccurate electronic chart that 
erroneously displayed the position of the reef.179  
In 2006, the towed jack-up barge Octopus grounded in the Orkneys. The area had last 
been surveyed in the 1840s and the grounding occurred on an uncharted bank. The MAIB report 
included a recommendation for relevant industry bodies to emphasise to shipmasters and 
officers the need to carefully consider the chart source data and, in the case of electronic charts, 
the CATZOC when passage planning.180 
In 2004, the tanker British Enterprise grounded near Istanbul. The chart indicated a 
sufficient depth of water for the vessel’s draft – she grounded on an uncharted shoal. The 
incident report reminded navigators to be aware of the importance of the chart source data, its 
age, and likely accuracy.181 
In 1992, the passenger vessel Queen Elizabeth 2 grounded on uncharted rocks while 
bound for New York. The last hydrographic survey, conducted in 1939, had not detected the 
rocks on which she grounded.182  
(c) Accuracy of Positional Information 
(i) GNSS 
The vessel’s position as displayed on the ECDIS screen is solely based on satellite-derived 
information from a GNSS. A GNSS is a satellite-based system providing continuous 
information on position, time, course and speed.183 The United States’ GPS and Russia’s Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) provide near global coverage,184 while Europe’s 
Galileo and China’s Beidou are currently developing towards full operational capacity. GPS is 
the most commonly used GNSS for marine navigation185 and will be focussed on in this section, 
although the operating principles for all GNSSs are similar.    
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(ii) GPS 
Position is determined by the intersection of distance measurements from multiple satellites 
within the GPS array. As the distance is calculated by the time a signal takes to travel the vast 
distance from the satellite to the ship-board GPS receiver, highly accurate clocks are carried on 
the satellites for precise timing of signal transmissions.  
GPS is prone to several error sources, including ionospheric and tropospheric delays 
(slowing of the signal as it passes through the atmosphere), signal multipath, frequency stability, 
orbital errors, receiver clock errors and receiver noise.186 Additional meteorological conditions 
such as solar storms or flares can degrade or disrupt satellite signals. In September 2017, 
radiation from the most powerful solar flare in over a decade caused high frequency (HF) radio 
blackouts across the daytime side of the earth (affecting communication over Africa, Europe 
and the Atlantic Ocean), and warnings were issued of disruptions to GPS signals.187  
Positional accuracy may further be affected by the geometry of the satellites visible to the 
GPS receiver.188 GPS is considered to have a ninety-five percent probability, meaning that only 
ninety-five out of one-hundred fixes will be within the stated accuracy.189 Although new 
technology and system upgrades have improved the accuracy of GPS to around ten190 to twenty-
five191 metres, it is not prudent for navigators to rely solely on satellite-derived positional 
information.  
(iii) GPS Jamming and Spoofing 
Jamming is achieved by denying GPS service in an area by transmitting a stronger signal on 
the same frequency.192 As GPS signals are fairly weak, jamming may be accomplished fairly 
easily. For around US$50,193 illegal jammers can be purchased online.194 The Resilient 
Navigation and Timing Foundation reports that Russia has advanced capabilities to disrupt 
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GPS, with 250 000 cell towers equipped with GPS jamming devices as a defence against missile 
attacks, and there have been press reports of Russian GPS jamming in both Moscow and the 
Ukraine.195 
Spoofing is achieved by sending false signals which cause GPS receivers to provide 
incorrect information.196 Exploring shipping’s vulnerability to deceptive GPS signals, 
researchers demonstrated how to ‘take over’ control of a vessel by GPS spoofing in 2013.197 
The false signals sent to the ship’s GPS were subtle enough that they could be disguised as the 
effects of ocean currents and were therefore undetected by the crew and systems onboard.  At 
a hackers’ convention in 2015, a researcher provided detailed instructions for building a 
spoofing device and sold kits for US$300.198  
In June 2017, more than twenty vessels were affected by a blatant GPS spoofing attack 
in the Black Sea.199 All of the vessels’ GPS positions showed their location to be at an inland 
airport in Russia. It was confirmed that there were no GPS signal anomalies, space weather or 
ongoing tests in the area.200 Disturbingly, one vessel’s GPS receiver indicated that the position 
was accurate to within one-hundred metres, yet displayed a position twenty-five nautical miles 
from her actual geographic location.201 Expert analysis has concluded that this was a clear case 
of GPS spoofing.202 
As GPS is part of an IBS, the false signals from jamming or spoofing will be transmitted 
to all components of the system, many of which rely on this information for calculations. 
Overreliance on satellite-derived positional information is a dangerous practice and navigators 
must ensure that they verify their position by an independent means such as radar or visual 
bearings. The marine insurance industry recognises this risk:   
‘A dependence on satellite positioning, especially GPS, is also singled-out as a threat to 
future shipping safety, especially in light of concerns about the reliability of available 
satellite-based systems and the potential threat to disruption to satellites by renegade groups 
or terrorists.’203 
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(d) Case Study – Accuracy of Positional Information 
In 2014, an ‘ECDIS-assisted collision’ occurred between two cargo vessels – MV Francisca 
and RMS Bremen – in the river port of Kiel. The incident investigation found that both vessels’ 
ECDIS showed that they did not make contact and were separated by a reasonable distance. 
The AIS recordings from the local VTS204 also indicated that the ships passed clear of one 
another. Yet, incontestably, a collision occurred, evidenced by the damage caused to the vessels 
by the impact.  
It was found that the GPS receivers on both vessels were functioning correctly. After 
extensive investigation and analysis, no abnormalities in the GPS system in the area could be 
identified. There was no evidence of interference from jamming or spoofing. The simulated 
GPS satellite constellations at the time of the incident were normal. Environmental factors were 
found not to be a contributory factor in the collision. The investigation was unable to 
definitively explain the apparent separation of the vessels’ true positions versus their displayed 
positions on ECDIS. There appeared to have been some sort of GPS anomaly or signal-
shadowing. The officers on both vessels failed to verify their displayed GPS positions by an 
independent means and relied entirely on the positions displayed on ECDIS.  
ECDIS and AIS cannot be solely relied on for positioning or collision avoidance. 
Maintaining a visual lookout and the use of radar and ARPA are essential for safe navigation. 
This incident highlights that it is precisely the growing use of ECDIS that makes it necessary 
for officers to continuously verify their position using all available means.205 
 
V User Settings 
(a) Chart Presentation 
ECDIS is capable of displaying vast amounts of information, which can overload and confuse 
navigators if not appropriately managed.206 A display screen that is cluttered with unnecessary 
information may hide or obscure essential charted features.207 To ensure safe navigation with 
ECDIS, it is of paramount importance that all safety settings are appropriately configured.208 
Degraded system accuracy is often associated with user set-up errors.  
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During hours of darkness, a ‘night’ display can be selected on ECDIS, which dims the 
brightness of the display and has a black background to protect watchkeepers’ night vision. 
Concerns have been raised that the night display in some models obscures cartographic features 
and makes essential safety features such as depth contours and hazards less evident. This was 
identified as a contributory factor in the grounding of the Costa Concordia, as the night display 
on the ECS in use reduced the officers’ situational awareness.209   
The ‘guard zone’ is an essential feature for detecting hazards to navigation, as it creates 
an arc ahead of the vessel that will trigger alarms to alert of unsafe conditions in the vessel’s 
path. The guard zone must be set to an appropriate time vector for advance notice to give the 
officer time to take avoiding action. If all safety settings are not correctly selected, the guard 
zone may not be able to recognise hazards in the vessel’s path – ECDIS can only protect the 
navigator from the dangers he/she has asked it to look for. 
The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association found that in all the grounding cases the 
club reviewed, the ECDIS safety settings were incorrectly or inappropriately configured; and 
in many cases the audible alarm had been disabled. The club further identified overreliance, 
complacency and inadequate training as risk factors for ECDIS.210    
(b) Display Modes 
ECDIS must display all chart information necessary for safe and efficient navigation, and have 
(at least) the same reliability and availability of presentation as paper charts.211 The operator, 
however, has extensive control over the information displayed on the ECDIS screen, and 
inappropriate selections in this regard can significantly affect the safety of navigation. There 
are three options for display modes – Display Base, Standard Display and All Other Information 
– and the screen will look drastically different depending on the selected mode. 
The mode intended to be used as a minimum during route planning and monitoring is 
Standard Display.212  If another display mode is selected, it must be possible to ‘default’ back 
to Standard Display by a single operator action.213 Navigators must bear in mind that Standard 
Display will not always include all information required for safe navigation in all 
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circumstances, such as underwater obstructions and spot soundings.214 It is however possible 
to select Display Base mode, which contains less information than Standard Display. As 
Display Base is not intended to be sufficient for safe navigation,215 the advisability of it 
remaining a display option is questionable.  
The third display mode option is All Other Information, which navigators can use to 
customise and enhance the display, as appropriate for the area of navigation. There are many 
navigational features contained in this last display mode, giving an officer many decisions to 
make as to which items to include in the display. This can be overwhelming if not familiar with 
the system and it may be convenient to simply select to display ‘all’, as this may seem to be the 
safest option to ensure that nothing is left out or overlooked. The danger is that the screen can 
then become cluttered, resulting in the officer becoming overloaded with superfluous 
information and losing situational awareness. The amount of information displayed must be 
managed to avoid obscuring charted features.216 Navigators must ensure that their selection 
displays all information needed for safe navigation, but avoid displaying unnecessary data 
which can distract their attention from hazards or safety-related data.  
Procedures for managing the display of charted information can vary extensively amongst 
ECDIS manufacturers – in some models the methods are simple and user-friendly, in others the 
functions are buried in sub-menus which are not easy to access. Given the importance of the 
chart display feature for safe navigation, it is essential that officers are thoroughly familiarised 
with these functions during type-specific training.  
Certain makes of ECDIS have been found not to display some shoal soundings in Base 
or Standard Display Modes, due to their encoding within IHO S-57.217 Due to an ECDIS 
anomaly, automatic grounding alarms have also not been triggered by these shoals in any 
display mode, even if their depth is less than the input safety depth value.218  
(c) Display Scale 
The selected display scale can have a significant effect on the safety of navigation with ECDIS. 
All charted information necessary for safe navigation may not be displayed if an ENC is 
zoomed too far in or out.219 
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If a chart is zoomed in beyond its compilation scale (the scale at which it was created), 
the positional accuracy of charted features can no longer be guaranteed. ECDIS provides an 
indication if the selected display is at a larger scale than that contained in the ENC220 and alerts 
the operator to this hazardous condition by displaying vertical grey lines (‘jail grid’).  
Zooming the display out too far also has potentially serious consequences, due to the 
SCAMIN221 feature, which reduces clutter on the screen by removing certain charted features 
from the display as it is zoomed out. This is much the same as paper charts, where significantly 
more detail is shown on larger scale than smaller scale charts. The danger is that an 
unexperienced or careless officer using ECDIS at a smaller scale than is appropriate for the 
navigational circumstances may not have all the safety-critical information required displayed 
on the chart. An under-scale indication222 advises the navigator that a larger scale – and 
therefore more detailed – chart is available for the area of operation. 
(d) Safety Contour 
The correct setting of the safety contour is critical, as it marks the division between safe and 
unsafe water on the ECDIS display.223 The appropriate value for the safety contour is generally 
determined by the following formula: vessel’s draught224 plus UKC (under keel clearance)225 
plus squat226 minus the height of tide.227 Once a navigator has selected a safety contour, the 
ECDIS emphasises it over the other contours on the display,228 – the safety contour line is 
thicker, darker and more prominent – making it easy to identify. In addition, the colouring on 
the chart is different on either side of the safety contour, with a blue shade indicating unsafe, 
shallow water inside229 the contour, and a white or grey shade indicating safe, deep water 
outside230 the safety contour.  
ECDIS will display a default safety contour of thirty metres if one is not selected by the 
user,231 although this may obscure hazards and needs to be set appropriately for each passage. 
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The display of isolated danger symbols or underwater obstructions can vary depending on the 
value of the safety contour.232 A prudent navigator will also consider the depth accuracy of the 
CATZOC area. 
When the ‘route check’ function is employed during passage planning, the system will 
provide an indication if the planned route crosses the selected safety contour, to draw the 
navigator’s attention to this hazard. While monitoring a route (sailing), ECDIS will sound an 
alarm if the vessel’s guard zone will cross the safety contour. If this zone has not been activated, 
the system will not be able to alert the navigator to a potential grounding situation. If the time 
vector for the zone is set too low, the officer may not give him/herself sufficient time for 
avoiding action once the alarm sounds. The safety contour is thus a crucial feature to assist the 
navigator in avoiding unsafe, shallow water, but is only effective if he/she has correctly 
configured the parameters. 
The safety depth is determined by the same formula as the safety contour, but applies to 
spot soundings233 rather than a contour line. ECDIS will emphasize soundings equal to or less 
than the safety depth234 by displaying them in a bold black rather than the light grey display for 
(safe) soundings of more than the safety depth. The safety depth feature does not, however, 
trigger an alarm. 
(e) Alarm Management 
ECDIS is required to provide appropriate audible alarms or visual indications relating to the 
navigational information displayed.235 As the integrating component of an IBS, ECDIS will 
also repeat alarms from other sensors. 
ECDIS alarms are intended to enhance the safety of navigation by alerting officers to 
imminent hazards, however in many incident investigations it is discovered that the audible 
alarms have been disabled as officers become frustrated by their excessive sounding. However, 
if the audible alarm has been disabled, the ECDIS no longer meets IMO performance standards. 
Many navigators lack an understanding of alarm management and fail to appreciate that 
all safety settings must be appropriately configured to avoid unnecessary alarms, alarm fatigue 
and alarm complacency. The issue of excessive alarms has been somewhat addressed by the 
IHO’s revised presentation library (see Chapter 5/I/b) which provides that navigational alarms 
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should be set to a minimum at the navigator’s discretion, or according to company policy. This 
will not, however, reduce the number of system alarms.     
(f)  Chart Updates and Passage Planning 
As per SOLAS Regulation V/27, all charts required for the intended voyage must be adequate 
and up-to-date. Vessels using ECDIS must have the latest available editions of ENCs, kept up-
to-date by official electronic updates (received from the chart supplier) and notices to mariners 
(manual updates).236 Official updates may be either fully automatic, requiring only a satellite 
connection, or semi-automatic, requiring a form of hardware, usually CD-ROM.  
Compared to the onerous process of updating paper charts (particularly if a world-wide 
folio is carried), the time commitment required of officers for official automatic updating of 
electronic charts is drastically reduced. This is especially beneficial given the cost-saving trend 
towards reducing manning levels on merchant vessels. 
The efficiency of passage planning is also significantly improved when using ECDIS237 
rather than paper charts, provided that the navigator uses the system in such a way as to ensure 
that all hazards are identified during planning. Safety settings must be correctly configured 
before commencing planning, including safety contour and safety depth, taking account of the 
vessel’s draught and the required UKC for the voyage. ECDIS has the capability to run an 
automated ‘route check’ of the planned route before saving it. However, the hazards identified 
by the system will depend on the user-selected safety parameters. In addition, some ECDIS 
have been found to only perform the route check function on larger scale ENCs, therefore 
alarms may not activate and this might not clearly be indicated on the display.238 Navigators 
thus cannot solely rely on the automated route check function and must conduct a 
comprehensive visual inspection of the passage plan at an appropriate scale to ensure the safety 
of the route.239 
If reusing a previous passage plan, the route must be rechecked to confirm that it is still 
safe.240 This highlights an advantage of paper charts over ENCs – as when navigators apply 
updates and corrections to paper charts, they are required to physically handle and study the 
charts during the process, and are thus aware of each of the ports or coastlines affected by the 
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updates. Changes to ports frequently called at, or in a vessel’s general geographic area of 
operation, are anticipated and passage plans amended accordingly.  
When updating ENCs, however, the navigator is very much removed from the process, 
as all that is required is to click a button to accept the latest updates, and the system does the 
rest in the background. Of interest to the officer is chiefly that the updates have all been 
correctly installed, which the system indicates and logs. The nature of each individual update 
is not generally displayed beyond a technical (S-57) code, which will not indicate whether 
updates affect the vessel’s frequently used routes. Thus, even if a route has been executed safely 
many times previously, it is essential to perform an automated route check on the ECDIS as 
well as a manual inspection of the planned passage before accepting it as safe. 
Another convenience of passage planning with ECDIS is that it allows for reversal of a 
route, particularly useful if a vessel transits between two ports frequently. It is crucial that the 
route is again carefully checked as described above after reversal, as imprudent use of this 
function has already resulted in six vessels navigating in the incorrect lanes of the Dover Strait 
Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS)241 – creating hazardous head-on situations with opposing 
traffic correctly following the lanes (and violating Rule 10 of the COLREGs).   
(g) AIS – The Need for Caution 
AIS is a maritime mobile band VHF broadcast system242 designed to automatically provide 
navigational information about a vessel to other vessels and coastal authorities.243 Displaying 
AIS targets on the ECDIS screen can assist a navigator’s cognitive assessment of other vessels’ 
movements and intentions. The limitations of AIS must, however, be heeded and overreliance 
on AIS information must be avoided. 
Vessels under 300gt engaged on international voyages and under 500gt not on 
international voyages are not required to be equipped with AIS.244 These smaller vessels such 
as yachts and fishing craft are often constructed of fibreglass or wood and may not make strong 
radar targets, so vigilance is required to ensure their detection. In addition, the master of any 
vessel may (at their professional discretion) switch their AIS off for safety or security reasons, 
such as in piracy areas. Navy vessels, warships and coastguard or fishery-patrol vessels 
generally do not transmit their AIS data either.  
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Navigators must thus be very aware that an ECDIS screen displaying AIS targets does 
not represent the complete vessel traffic situation. Radar, ARPA and a visual lookout must be 
used to provide full situational awareness and to ensure compliance with the COLREGs. AIS 
may be used to assist in collision avoidance decision-making, but may not be relied upon as the 
sole information system in this regard.245 
(h) Errors of Interpretation 
Errors of interpretation can degrade the safety of navigation and occur when officers 
misconstrue information on the ECDIS display. Common errors include confusion of display 
mode or display scale (sometimes ignoring the overscale indication) and uncritical acceptance 
of the vessel’s position by neglecting the ninety-five percent probability of positional accuracy. 
The Japan P&I Club found that  
‘more human errors are caused by misinterpretation of information displayed on ECDIS, 
and this implies that the use of ECDIS leads to hazardous situations’.246 
Navigators must bear in mind that although the ECDIS display appears modern and thus 
accurate, the source data used for the chart compilation is the same as paper charts. User settings 
and safety parameters should be checked at the start of each watch. Navigational information 
derived from the ECDIS must be verified by an independent means and the radar overlay feature 
is a convenient way of detecting any discrepancies between the two systems.     
(i) Case Studies – User Settings 
In 2014, the cargo vessel Rickmers Dubai collided with Walcon Wizard, an unmanned crane 
barge which was being towed in the Dover Strait TSS. The investigation found that Rickmers 
Dubai’s OOW did not keep a proper lookout and relied solely on AIS information displayed on 
the ECDIS for collision avoidance. He failed to use the radar or ARPA, to maintain a visual 
lookout, or to take note of safety broadcasts issued advising of the tug and tow’s position in the 
TSS. The officer’s situational awareness was poor and he was not proactive in monitoring his 
watchkeeping duties. The investigation report suggests that a balance needs to be found between 
overreliance on AIS and its effective use, and that it is crucial that officers are fully aware of 
the system’s capabilities and limitations.247 Regarding ECDIS, the report states:  
‘ECDIS is capable of providing a wealth of information to the user, including charts, 
waypoints, safe water and overlaid AIS information. However, it is not a “one-stop shop” 
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which is able to provide all of the information required by an OOW. ECDIS must be used 
in conjunction with other aids to navigation and collision avoidance, particularly radar and 
visual lookout.’ 
Also in 2014, the ro-ro ferry Commodore Clipper grounded on a charted shoal near 
Guernsey. ECDIS was the primary means of navigation onboard, but was not utilised 
effectively as key safety features were either disabled or ignored. The officers had completed 
generic ECDIS and type-specific familiarisation training. Passage planning was insufficient as 
the very low tide and effect of squat were not adequately considered, thus the bridge team did 
not appreciate the hazard posed by the shoal. The audible alarm had been disabled and the safety 
contour was inappropriately set.248 
The bulker CSL Thames ran aground near Scotland in 2011. ECDIS was the primary 
means of navigation and no paper charts were carried. The OOW altered course for collision 
avoidance, without noticing that this would take the ship into shallow water. The ECDIS alarm 
was inoperative and the officers had not questioned the absence of an alarm, due to their 
insufficient ECDIS knowledge. The officers had all attended generic ECDIS training courses, 
but they were found to lack comprehension of the system’s safety features. The OOW ‘knew’ 
that ECDIS was supposed to sound an alarm if the vessel was running into danger and thus felt 
no obligation to verify the vessel’s position. His confidence and overreliance were clearly 
misplaced and reckless given that the safety contour was inappropriately set and the audible 
alarm not functional. The ergonomics of the bridge layout and location of the ECDIS were also 
considered factors in this incident.249  
In 2009, the container vessel Maersk Kendal ran aground in the Singapore Strait after 
altering course for collision avoidance. Paper charts were the primary means of navigation and 
ECDIS was intended for use as an aid to navigation only. Although relevant checklists for 
passage planning had been completed, the plan lacked sufficient detail on both the paper charts 
and ECDIS. The ECDIS had not been configured to utilise built-in safety features such as safety 
depth, danger areas or a guard zone. As the officers had attended a generic ECDIS training 
course, they should have realised the advantage of employing these features. The bridge team 
over-relied on the inappropriately set-up ECDIS and failed to adequately monitor the ship’s 
position.250       
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The cargo ship CFL Performer ran aground off the English coast in 2008. The grounding 
occurred twenty-nine minutes after the OOW had altered course to follow the passage plan 
shown on the ECDIS. The planned route took the vessel across an area where the charted depth 
of water was less than the vessel’s draught – the route was obviously not adequately checked 
for navigational hazards during planning or monitoring. ECDIS was the primary means of 
navigation onboard, but none of the vessel’s officers had been trained in its use and thus many 
of the system’s features which could have prevented the grounding were not utilised. The 
officers were not aware of the significance of the safety contour and safety depth, or how to set 
up a guard zone.251   
The container vessel LT Cortesia ran aground on the Varne Bank in 2008. The OOW 
over-relied on an unofficial ECS and his situational awareness was reduced due to poorly 
configured user settings. The safety contour and alarms were inappropriately set. The night 
display on the ECS was identified as a causal factor in the grounding, due to the colour contrast 
not clearly differentiating shallow water depths, and chart symbols being difficult to detect on 
the darkened display. If the officer had fixed the vessel’s position on the paper chart – which 
was legally the primary means of navigation – the hazard would have been clearly evident. The 
incident report found: 
‘Too often, the distinction between the various operating modes of an electronic chart 
display system are not clear enough, and the resulting legal consequences are extremely 
far-reaching.’252 
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CHAPTER 4 THE HUMAN FACTOR AND HUMAN ERROR IN THE USE OF ECDIS 
I Introduction 
From 2011 to 2015, the number of marine casualties and incidents reported to the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) steadily increased.253 Half of the casualties were of a 
navigational nature, such as groundings and collisions.254 The International Union of Marine 
Insurance (IUMI) reported an increase in major vessel casualties in 2016, the second year in a 
row after more than a decade of decline, with the frequency of total loss caused by groundings 
having increased more quickly than other categories of casualty.255 Given that the primary 
function of ECDIS is to contribute to safe navigation,256 should technological advancements in 
bridge equipment not have led to a decrease in the occurrence of marine casualties since the 
carriage of ECDIS became mandatory?  
Instead, recent years have seen several ECDIS-assisted navigational accidents, incidents 
and near misses.257 Although ECDIS design issues have been identified, analysis of these 
accidents indicates that the causes are predominantly not system design failures, but are more 
commonly due to operational failures by deck officers in their use of ECDIS.258 The objective 
of this chapter is thus to critically evaluate the human factor and human error in the use of 
ECDIS. 
 
II The Human Factor and Human Error in the Maritime Domain 
(a) Overview 
Human error has long been regarded as a major causal factor in maritime incidents, with 
between seventy-five and ninety-six percent of marine casualties being attributable to human 
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error.259 In recent years, analysis of shipping casualties has generated a growing awareness of 
the central importance of the human element.260  
The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) recently identified a lack of situational 
awareness as the most significant of ‘the deadly dozen’ human factors in maritime safety,261 a 
finding supported by an extensive American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) study.262 Case studies 
in this paper have illustrated how the use of ECDIS may lead to a lack of situational awareness 
by watchkeepers. A study by the US Coast Guard identified fatigue, inadequate communication 
and inadequate technical knowledge (chiefly the improper use of technology) as the three 
greatest human factor problems263 at sea. The poor design of automation, decisions based on 
inadequate information, and faulty standards, policies or practices were also found to be 
issues.264  
The IMO adopted a resolution outlining its vision, principles and goals for the human 
element in 1997, which was updated in 2003.265 Through this resolution, the IMO 
acknowledged the need for more focus on human-related activities in the safe operation of 
vessels and assigned the human element issue high priority due to its prominent role in the 
prevention of maritime casualties:  
‘Effective remedial action following maritime casualties requires a sound understanding of 
human element involvement in accident causation. This is gained by thorough investigation 
and systematic analysis of casualties for the contributory factors and the causal chain of 
events.’266  
The ISM Code addresses the human element by establishing a standard for the safe 
management and operation of vessels and the implementation of safety management systems.267 
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The IMO has thus initiated measures to address the human factor as a component of vessel 
casualties and to mitigate associated environmental damage.268  
In addition to safety considerations, maritime casualties give rise to significant financial 
implications for shipowners, charterers and insurers. Over a recent ten-year period, the Standard 
P&I Club estimated that insurance claims cost the P&I industry US$15 billion, with sixty-five 
percent of pay-outs (US$10 billion) being for incidents in which humans played the principal 
part.269 ‘The types of claim we see … keep recurring, and inevitably these are rooted in the 
more unfortunate consequences of human behaviour.’270  
(b) Error Management 
Since the majority of shipping casualties are caused by human error, considering the human 
factor in shipboard operations is of paramount importance to improve safety.271 Risk reduction 
and error management are essential in the safety-critical, high-risk maritime industry, however 
‘[t]o err is human…’272 and the complete elimination of human error is an impossibility. 
However, if people’s understanding, actions and behaviour change – many maritime accidents, 
incidents and errors could be avoided.273 Error management is the responsibility of the wider 
maritime industry, not only seafarers: 
‘The human element is a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety, 
security and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire spectrum of human 
activities performed by ships’ crews, shore-based management, regulatory bodies, 
recognized organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant parties, all of whom 
need to co-operate to address human element issues effectively.’274 
Human error has been controlled in other industries through use of a human-centred 
approach; and increased human-centred design, that takes account of people’s abilities and 
limitations.275  
In developing regulations and policies, sufficient safeguards should be included therein 
to ensure that a single human or organisational error does not result in an accident through their 
application.276 Effective maritime resource management has been proven to prevent shipping 
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accidents caused by human and organisational errors277 and the requirements for bridge 
resource management training for deck officers are discussed in Chapter 4/IV/e.  
Conditions experienced in a shipboard environment can have a detrimental effect on 
human performance, including rough weather, ship motion, temperature, noise and vibration.278 
Error management requires an understanding of the nature of the errors experienced and the 
context in which they occur. 
(c) Types of Human Error 
Human error may be described as being an incorrect decision, an improperly performed action 
or an inappropriate lack of action (inaction).279 Depending on the nature of the task and their 
experience with the given situation, people operate at one of three levels of performance – skill-
based, rule-based or knowledge-based280 – and there are error types associated with each level.  
Skill-based errors are errors of execution that occur when an individual is very 
experienced and familiar with the task at hand.281 Reactions are automatic or reflexive and the 
cognitive processing of information occurs sub-consciously, so minimal mental resources are 
required and attention may be diverted to other activities. These error types include 
unintentional actions that occur due to a failure of attention (slips) or a failure of memory 
(lapses).282 In the context of bridge watchkeeping at sea, these error types are more common 
amongst senior officers whose vast experience may lead to complacency in the execution of 
routine navigational tasks. 
When an individual is only somewhat familiar with a task but lacks the experience to 
perform it at a sub-conscious level, rule-based performance errors occur due to their inability 
to recognise or comprehend a situation.283 Information is misinterpreted and the incorrect rule 
is applied, selected from a choice of memorised rules. These errors are classed as mistakes – 
the action is intentional, however the individual did not mean to take an incorrect course of 
action or violate a rule.284 Rule-based errors are more commonly made by junior officers who 
do not yet have extensive bridge watchkeeping experience and are following rules learned 
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during their training – their situational awareness and assessment capabilities still require 
further development.    
Shortcomings in an individual’s knowledge can result in knowledge-based performance 
errors.285 This error type may also occur due to a limited ability to apply existing knowledge to 
new situations.286 Although these errors are more common for junior officers, even seasoned 
navigators may make knowledge-based errors when faced with a situation of which they have 
no experience.  
All of the above error types are found in the use of ECDIS, as illustrated in the case studies 
in this dissertation. In addition, officers commit violations, which differ from mistakes in that 
violations are intentional actions that deliberately contravene known rules, policies or 
procedures. Overreliance on ECDIS may be considered a breach of SOLAS and STCW 
requirements,287 as well as a violation of the COLREGs if officers fail to use all available means 
to maintain a proper lookout. The standard operating procedures for the use of ECDIS should 
be clearly defined in the SMS, although officers are seen not adhering to these company-
specific rules, thus breaching ISM Code requirements.  
 
III Automation and Human Performance 
(a) Overview 
Human performance can be significantly affected by the design of the technology that people 
have to work with.288 If automation is designed without sufficient consideration of the 
information that the operator needs to access, critical data may be displayed in a manner that is 
difficult to interpret, causing confusion.289 Automation changes the task it is meant to support 
and creates new error pathways and knowledge demands.290 The efficiency of operations can 
be increased by investment in automation, but without a parallel investment in training, risk-
taking can also increase – particularly given the recent trend towards reduced manning levels 
on merchant vessels.291 Automation can generate more distance between people and the world 
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around them, isolating them from their environment and making them less likely to notice 
changes in operating conditions or to take effective correcting action.292  
In modern IBSs, ECDIS acts as the integrating component, tying together information 
from numerous sensors and inputs. In these systems, the bridge equipment essentially also 
forms part of the bridge team.293 The way in which users interact with equipment is referred to 
as the human machine interface (HMI) and relates to things like displays, menus, controls and 
alarms.294 Despite the advantages of automation, system designers often neglect to consider end 
users. Navigators are thus required to monitor and integrate complex data from numerous 
inputs.  Current initiatives to develop a human-centred design approach for navigation systems 
are explored in Chapter 5/I. 
(b) The Effects of Automation on Decision-Making 
Officers serving onboard merchant vessels are embedded in organisational cultures that are 
dominated by time and cost,295 commercial pressure being an ever-present reality. Decisions 
made in this context tend to favour efficiency over thoroughness, guided by the experience of 
the individual and the training they have received.296 If officers are insufficiently trained or if 
they perceive organisational expectations as too demanding, the risks taken in their decision-
making processes will increase.297 People generally prefer the path of least resistance – in both 
cognitive and physical work – thus decision-makers often adopt strategies intended to reduce 
cognitive effort and minimise the likelihood of information overload.298 
The introduction of automation can change decision-making patterns and alter how 
situations are assessed and handled.299 It has been seen in a number of the case studies in this 
dissertation that ECDIS has the potential to reduce watchkeepers’ situational awareness, 
principally due to overreliance on automation. We have seen that officers adopt a passive role 
in watchkeeping, relying on automated system alarms to alert them to potentially unsafe 
situations, rather than proactively monitoring their surroundings on the bridge and the dynamic 
operating environment at sea. This role as a system monitor breeds complacency and boredom, 
and fosters fundamentally unsafe navigational practices.  
                                                 
292 Ibid 11. 
293 Norris, Andy ‘Making equipment part of the team’ (2014) Issue 7 The Navigator 10. 
294 Ibid.  
295 Gregory 27.  
296 Ibid 27, 30. 
297 Ibid 24. 
298 Mosier, Kathleen & Skitka, Linda ‘Human Decision Makers and Automated Decision Aids: Made for Each 
Other?’ in Parasuraman, R & Mouloua, M (eds) Automation and Human Performance: Theory and Applications 
(1996) 203. 
299 Ibid 216. 
54 
Research has found that over-automated systems can encourage ‘automation-induced 
complacency’ and that delegation to automated systems makes human decision-makers less 
attentive and less likely to notice unusual occurrences that are not brought to their explicit 
attention by the system.300 The failure of decision-makers to notice problems because an 
automated aid fails to detect them, or when they take inappropriate action based on automated 
information, is known as ‘automation bias’.301 In the aviation industry, automation bias has 
been identified as a contributory factor in a high percentage of incidents attributable to pilot 
error.302 Automated systems do not indicate their limitations to the user,303 encouraging a 
misplaced perception of the systems’ infallibility and exacerbating the tendency of 
overreliance.304 
The use of ECDIS is intended to improve the safety of navigation and many of the 
system’s automated features are aimed at reducing maritime incidents caused by human error. 
ECDIS carriage is mandatory on merchant vessels and officers may therefore feel justified 
basing their navigational decisions on information automatically generated by the ECDIS, 
notwithstanding that the system may not be correctly configured to provide the navigator with 
all the salient facts they should be considering. There may be a sense of abdication of decision-
making responsibility when relying on automated systems305 such as ECDIS, partly due to 
automation bias.  
Given the common factor of overreliance in many of the ECDIS-assisted incidents 
studied, officers’ navigational decision-making processes while using ECDIS require 
evaluation:  
‘The psychology of the decision-making environment needs to be examined closely to 
ensure that automated feedback is in fact used only as part of a more thorough decision-
making process. … To build a strong relationship between human decision-makers and 
automated decision aids, attention needs to be given to design issues on the one hand, and 
human psychology on the other.’306  
Design issues identified within ECDIS are proactively being addressed by the maritime 
industry (see Chapter 5/I), leaving the more complex human factor to consider. Navigators need 
to be mindful that merely because the ECDIS display appears believable and trustworthy – and 
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that the path of least resistance is to make decisions based on the displayed data – more 
cognitive effort is required to maintain situational awareness and ensure safe navigational 
decision-making.    
(c) Complacency 
The UK MCA recently identified complacency (defined as ‘a misplaced feeling of confidence 
that everything is OK’) as one of the significant human factors that can influence human error 
and lead to maritime accidents.307 Complacency occurs as a result of an individual’s poorly 
calibrated sense of risk.308 A perceived familiarity with one’s operating environment can breed 
complacency and make familiar actions seem less risky.309 Common reasons for complacency 
include inadequate monitoring of a situation, insufficient knowledge or experience to recognise 
that a situation has changed, fatigue, and the same task having been repeated satisfactorily on 
many previous occasions without incident.310  
The Swedish Club has identified officers’ complacency in not verifying information and 
making assumptions about displayed information as immediate causes of incidents leading to 
navigational claims, and highlights the importance of officers being aware of the errors and 
limits of navigational equipment.311 As described in the previous section, passive watchkeeping 
practices of monitoring automated systems like ECDIS can breed complacency and lead to a 
lack of situational awareness, posing a clear hazard to the safety of navigation.  
(d) Overreliance 
Overreliance on ECDIS has resulted in some officers becoming reluctant to look out of the 
bridge windows. In a recent study, officers participating in exercises on a navigational simulator 
were monitored using eye-tracking software, to assess what sources of information they were 
using for decision-making.312 It was found that officers spent a significant amount of time 
watching the ECDIS screen, resulting in only eleven percent of their time being spent looking 
out of the bridge windows.313 Besides being manifestly bad seamanship, these practices can 
reduce situational awareness and may contravene Rule 5 of the COLREGs which requires 
officers to use all available means to maintain a proper lookout. 
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Overreliance on automated systems and ECDIS was discussed extensively in Chapter 
4/III/b above. Situational awareness and the application of basic seamanship skills seem to be 
fading with the increase of automation and electronic decision-support systems.314 There is an 
increasing tendency for officers to become over-reliant on electronic aids to navigation without 
an appreciation of the systems’ vulnerability in terms of accuracy, reliability, availability and 
integrity.315  
(e) Generational Considerations 
Many younger officers have now grown up with technology at their fingertips and are 
comfortable with its use. Due to immersion in this culture of information technology, they tend 
to revert to electronic displays for their primary decision-support systems during times of 
stress.316 
‘It is probable that technology is having an adverse effect on the way in which some 
seafarers conduct their business. There are various reasons for this, not least the universal 
problem of a generation that is being brought up to rely on technology to solve problems 
without having to process information for themselves.’317 
Although a universal phenomenon, this reliance on technology is particularly dangerous 
in the maritime domain and highlights the importance of younger officers understanding the 
fallibilities of automated systems. Some junior officers become so absorbed in technology, 
particularly ECDIS, that their situational awareness is confined to the displayed screen – rather 
than looking out of the windows.318  
There is a further complication with the use of ECDIS that can affect the bridge dynamics 
and confuse the norm of the most experienced officers having the most knowledge. As many 
junior officers are familiar with the digital world, they acquire the basic technical competencies 
to operate ECDIS quickly, while there is sometimes a reluctance from older masters and senior 
officers to learn new computer-based skills319 which take them away from their comfort zone 
of traditional methods of navigation. Many senior navigators who learned their trade on trusted 
paper charts are unwilling to place the same trust in ECDIS as their juniors do, and are less 
inclined or interested in learning the intricacies of the systems’ technical operation. 
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Safety issues can arise if senior officers feel that junior officers better understand ECDIS 
than they do – and allow their professional pride to hold them back from learning – particularly 
as much of the merchant fleet is now paperless. A case in point is the Ovit grounding, where 
the master was not familiar with the ECDIS in use, despite having attended the required training 
courses. This is illustrated in the MAIB report, which states: 
‘Attendees at the [type-specific] training courses were a mix of senior and junior officers 
with varying degrees of experience at sea and with ECDIS. Ovit’s master was 
uncomfortable completing the course with junior officers. In particular, he found it 
embarrassing to ask questions.’320 
Navigational safety may also be compromised if masters delegate their navigational 
responsibilities to junior officers who are more adept at the use of ECDIS. The master remains 
ultimately responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel, but how can he/she check the safety 
of a passage plan on the ECDIS if not proficient in the use of the system? When asked by 
surveyors to demonstrate an operation on the ECDIS during audits or inspections, many 
masters’ first response is to call one of the junior officers to do it for them.321 This is particularly 
concerning given that the master should be ensuring that all officers use ECDIS in accordance 
with SMS procedures. 
 
IV Safety Management 
(a) Overview 
Effective implementation of the ISM Code and a genuine organisational commitment to a 
culture of safety can reduce occurrences of human error. Shipowners and managers are 
responsible for the development of a company organisational culture which educates and 
motivates seafarers towards compliance, and not only through the application of the ISM 
Code.322  
Unfortunately, increasing evidence is emerging during PSC inspections of a lack of 
attention to the application of regulations and procedures, including non-compliance with the 
ISM Code.323 The Swedish Club has found that many collisions occur due to the company’s 
SMS and navigation procedures being ignored by officers324 and concludes that no matter how 
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good the technology onboard is, vessels still collide – mainly due to a lack of safety culture and 
inexperienced crew.325 
(b) Manning 
Regulation 2.7 of the Maritime Labour Convention326 requires member states to ensure that 
their vessels have a sufficient number of seafarers employed onboard for safe operation, taking 
account of fatigue. Economic considerations have, however, resulted in a trend towards reduced 
crew sizes and minimum manning. This increases the workload of those onboard,327 particularly 
for officers who must carry the extra paperwork burden required under the ISM Code. Pressure 
and stress due to tight operational schedules and deadlines; as well as the lack of an adequate 
safety culture onboard have been identified as potential pre-cursors to human error and risk 
tolerance.328  
(c) Fatigue 
Fatigue has been identified as a contributory factor in many maritime accidents.329 The IMO 
developed guidelines on fatigue mitigation and management330 which describe fatigue as:  
‘A reduction in physical and/or mental capability as the result of physical, mental or 
emotional exertion which may impair nearly all physical abilities including: strength; 
speed; reaction time; coordination; decision-making; or balance.’  
Fatigue is particularly dangerous in shipping operations as it results in impaired 
performance and diminished alertness:  
‘The technical and specialized nature of this industry requires constant alertness and intense 
concentration from its workers. Fatigue is also dangerous because it affects everyone 
regardless of skill, knowledge and training.’331  
The intention of the IMO’s guidelines was to provide information on seafarer fatigue, 
solutions to combat it and to help prevent future fatigue-related accidents from occurring.332 
However, compliance with the IMO guidelines is voluntary, even though fatigue now poses 
such a risk for the safety of life at sea.333 
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The Manila Amendments to the STCW Code increased the mandatory minimum hours-
of-rest requirement for seafarers and compelled Administrations to take account of the danger 
posed by seafarer fatigue, particularly if their duties involve the safe operation of the vessel.334 
Even with this updated legislation in place, commercial pressure, reduced manning levels and 
the operational requirements of many working merchant vessels create a shipboard environment 
in which fatigue is still a reality.  
Fatigued officers experience a reduced decision-making ability, slower response times, 
lapses in memory and an inability to concentrate,335 potentially contributing to unsafe practices 
and affecting how information is processed while using ECDIS. The ability to perceive, 
understand and respond to stimuli is affected by fatigue336 and chronically fatigued individuals 
tend to have a higher risk tolerance, selecting easier, riskier options. The passive watchkeeping 
role that some officers adopt in the use of ECDIS may increase the effects of fatigue, due to the 
monotonous nature of monitoring an automated system. Some ECDIS models have been found 
not to adequately draw attention to hazards in the night display mode – a fatigued officer may 
also be less likely to recognise these hazards. 
(d) Local Practices 
In safety-critical environments like the maritime industry, it is important to understand how 
people learn.337 If officers have not received effective formal training for their navigational 
duties, on-the-job informal learning from other officers onboard will naturally occur. The 
danger is that the existing officers may not themselves be adequately trained and thus transfer 
unsafe, risky practices and short-cuts in the operation of equipment.338 
Correcting these ‘local practices’ or procedural violations can reduce accidents and 
improve maritime safety, but if this behaviour is not addressed it can become the new norm, 
lowering safety standards and increasing risk tolerance.339 Reasons for this unsafe behaviour 
include ineffective training, insufficient supervision and monitoring, an ineffective onboard 
safety culture, the convenience of shortcuts, and not comprehending the risks involved.340   
Shortcuts in the use of ECDIS are common, particularly since there were no mandated 
training requirements when the equipment was first installed onboard many vessels. Officers 
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thus intuitively figured out how to make ECDIS work for them in the easiest way possible, 
without comprehending the system’s operation or limitations. Even if officers have 
subsequently received the training required by the Manila Amendments, these convenient old 
habits may be hard to break. ISM audits should be thorough enough to identify unsafe local 
practices in the use of ECDIS, and rectify them by ensuring the navigational procedures 
contained in the SMS are followed in practice. 
(e) Bridge Resource Management 
Bridge Resource Management (BRM)341 is the effective management and utilisation of all 
resources – human and technical – available to a bridge team, to ensure the safe completion of 
their vessel’s voyage.342 The Manila Amendments included requirements for BRM training for 
deck officers.343 Effective BRM allows the bridge team to anticipate and correctly respond to 
the ship’s changing situation, while poor BRM may lead to a loss of situational awareness.344 
BRM training equips officers with skills to recognise developing error-chains and act to 
break the chain of accident causation. The concept for this training originates in the aviation 
industry, where it was developed to address the human element in pilot error.  
(f) Resilience Engineering  
Despite humans’ many flaws, the human factor in the prevention of maritime casualties in a 
high-risk domain should not be underestimated. This sentiment is expressed in the opening 
dedication in Gregory: 
‘The global shipping industry is a dangerous place. Every day, it loses two ships, pays out 
US$4 million in claims and radically changes the lives of hundreds of people forever. 
Human behaviour is the source of virtually all such loss. It is also the reason why the loss 
is not greater.’ (author’s emphasis) 
The growing complexity of systems introduces escalating challenges for safety and risk 
management.345 Resilience engineering recognises that due to their ability to continually adjust, 
adapt and compensate, humans are vital in complex, integrated systems.346 Resilience 
engineering is concerned with constructing ‘systems that are able to circumvent accidents 
through anticipation, survive disruptions through recovery, and grow through adaptation’.347  
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People are able to cognitively assess situations and exercise judgement, allowing them to 
identify and remedy disruptions more adeptly than automated systems can. Human agents thus 
introduce resiliency into automated systems and are considered a net asset, despite human 
deficiencies.348  
The recognition of the human role in the safe operation of complex systems is pertinent 
given the increase in the automation of shipboard systems, as well as advances in the automation 
of vessels themselves.349 The application of resilience engineering principles to improve safety 
in the maritime domain requires development and is a field for further research.  
  
                                                 
348 Ibid. 
349 The IMO is currently conducting a scoping exercise to determine how the safe operation of autonomous ships 
may be introduced in IMO instruments.  
62 
CHAPTER 5 INDUSTRY INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF 
NAVIGATION WITH ECDIS AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS TO 
MITIGATE UNSAFE PRACTICES 
I Industry Initiatives to Improve the Safety of Navigation with ECDIS 
(a) MAIB Safety Study 
The manner in which officers use ECDIS was identified as a contributory factor in numerous 
vessel grounding investigations conducted by the MAIB. It was found that ECDIS was not 
being used as it was designed to be, with officers employing inappropriate chart scales and 
safety contours, disabling alarms and guard zones, and not using the automatic route check 
function to ensure the safety of planned passages.350 
Following the groundings of CMA CGM Vasco da Gama and Muros, the MAIB 
commenced a safety study351 in late 2017 to assess why officers are not using ECDIS as 
envisaged by regulators and system manufacturers.352  
‘The overarching objective is to provide comprehensive data that can be used to improve 
the functionality of future ECDIS systems by encouraging the greater use of operator 
experience and human-centred design principles.’353 
This study was launched in the very latter stages of research for this dissertation, and the 
findings will be of great interest to the author.  
(b) Updated IHO Standards 
In a review of their standards conducted due to ECDIS anomalies, the IHO found that their 
standards had been interpreted differently by manufacturers. IHO standards S-52, S-63 and S-
64 have thus recently been updated to mitigate future implementation irregularities, address 
anomalies and improve ECDIS usability.354 Changes include the reduction of excessive alarms 
and standardisation of chart symbology.  
The new standards entered into force in 2017 and vessels must update their systems to 
ensure compliance with SOLAS carriage requirements, although there is some debate as to 
whether ECDIS software updates are mandatory under the current legal framework.355 The 
complications with updating software on older ECDIS units was described in Chapter 3/III/g.  
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(c) Port State Control CICs 
Recommendations in the MAIB report into the grounding of the Ovit included a proposal to the 
Paris MOU to conduct a Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) of ECDIS-fitted vessels to 
establish the standards of officers’ knowledge. Seven of the nine PSC MOUs conducted CICs 
from September to November 2017 focussing on the safety of navigation, including ECDIS 
use.  
The CIC included the requirement for the provisions of SOLAS and STCW relating to 
ECDIS to be met, and for officers to demonstrate familiarisation with ECDIS. The results of 
the campaigns are currently being analysed.  
(d) S-Mode 
The Nautical Institute (NI), International Association of Institutes of Navigation and other 
bodies have proposed that the IMO should agree to a single set of guidelines for manufacturers 
to use when designing navigation systems.356 Their proposal is for a standard mode (S-Mode) 
that is identical by all manufacturers at a basic level, however more specialist modes would also 
be available.357 Officers would thus require less time to become familiar with the basic 
operation of the system, which should improve competence and safety. 
There is not, however, blanket agreement within the maritime industry of this approach 
to S-Mode, with some parties358 cautious about standardisation of a separate, independent mode 
only. Interestingly, recent research aimed at informing future ECDIS design by investigating 
officers’ experiences therewith, found that operators would prefer ECDIS to be highly 
customizable.359 
S-Mode is specifically directed at how the equipment is controlled and how data is 
accessed and displayed. The NI conducted an online survey to collect user input on S-Mode’s 
proposed design. S-Mode would be of particular benefit to newly-joined officers who have not 
completed type-specific training on the ECDIS in use onboard, as well as pilots and surveyors. 
Standardisation of features also makes sense as officers are increasingly multilingual. The 
development of an S-Mode has been identified by the IMO as one of its priorities for E-
navigation. 
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(e) E-Navigation 
The IMO’s E‐Navigation initiative is expected to have a significant effect on the future of 
navigation. E-navigation is defined as,  
‘the harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of marine 
information onboard and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth to berth navigation 
and related services for safety and security at sea and protection of the marine 
environment’.360 
The goal is to improve the safety of navigation and reduce errors, by meeting present 
and future user needs through harmonisation of navigation systems and supporting shore 
services.361 The core elements of the onboard application of E-navigation include actively 
engaging officers in the navigation process to carry out their duties as efficiently as possible, 
while preventing distraction and overburdening.362  
The IMO approved the Guideline on Software Quality Assurance and Human-Centred 
Design for E-navigation (MSC.1/Circ.1512) in 2015. The focus on user needs and human-
centred design will hopefully address many of the human factors identified as problematic in 
the use of ECDIS. 
(f) Software Maintenance Standard 
As there is currently no industry-standard for software maintenance of onboard equipment, 
BIMCO363 was concerned by the associated increasing risk of incidents on ships, delays and 
costs to shipowners and cyber security concerns.364 BIMCO has seen incidents of malfunctions 
in navigation equipment and ships suffering blackouts due to unexpected complications with 
software updates.365 BIMCO and CIRM (Comité International Radio-Maritime – the 
international association for the marine electronics industry) have thus submitted the maritime 
industry’s first proposal for an industry-wide standard for software maintenance to the IMO for 
consideration.366   
The goal of the standard is to ensure that software updates occur in a secure and 
systematic way. The scope of the standard extends to shipboard equipment and associated 
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integrated systems, including navigation systems.367 Various stakeholders involved in the 
software maintenance of shipboard equipment are identified, including shipowners, masters and 
crews.368 Requirements for shipowners include that maintenance-related operations be carried 
out in accordance with the ISM Code, procedures are in place to ensure that software is up-to-
date in accordance with the latest regulatory requirements, and possible risks to the ship are 
identified and assessed.369 The IMO will consider the proposed standard at the Sub-Committee 
on Navigation, Communications, Search & Rescue meeting in February 2018. 
(g) Cyber Security 
The IMO has issued guidelines on maritime cyber risk management370 and has adopted a 
resolution requiring shipowners and managers to incorporate cyber risk management and 
security into ISM SMSs by 2021.371 Amendments to the ISM Code should be considered372 to 
ensure that the threat is addressed in a comprehensive manner and applied consistently across 
the world’s fleet.  
The international shipping industry has proactively responded to the threat by producing 
its own guidelines373 (aligned with the IMO’s) to provide practical recommendations on 
maritime cyber risk management.  
 
II Additional Considerations to Mitigate Unsafe Practices in the Use of ECDIS by Deck 
Officers 
Shortcomings in the design and technical operational aspects of ECDIS have been identified 
and are being addressed through initiatives by parties in the maritime industry, as described in 
the previous section. This research has found that the other primary factor inhibiting ECDIS 
from effectually achieving its intended function of contributing to safe navigation is inadequate 
officer training, as illustrated by the case studies. This section thus considers ways to improve 
ECDIS training and mitigate unsafe practices by deck officers in the use of ECDIS. 
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This research has identified the lack of global consistency in the application of STCW 
training standards as a contributory factor in the unsafe use of ECDIS. Recruitment of officers 
from developing nations due to lower wage expectations may make commercial sense for 
shipowners, but introduces risks due to the possibility of inferior navigational competence. The 
discrepancies in training standards need to be addressed and it may also be time to re-evaluate 
the effectiveness of current STCW provisions. 
The MCA recently recognised that competence entails more than holding an appropriate 
training certificate, and identified capability – defined as ‘the blend of knowledge, skills and 
attitude to enable effective, safe performance’ – as one of the significant human factors that can 
influence human error and cause accidents.374 As part of their Continuing Professional 
Development programme, the NI has launched a Command Diploma Scheme. Guidance for 
candidates states:  
‘Industry players, including employers, are becoming aware that STCW should be regarded 
as a minimum standard. There is significant variation between flag states and individual 
training institutions in the way that this standard is delivered and the degree to which it is 
met’.  
The North P&I Club suggests that a component in most major claims is the issue of officer 
quality, and as part of a loss prevention effort they are subsidising the cost of an online seafarer 
evaluation programme. Their determination that it is more cost effective to subsidise additional 
training than to pay the costs involved in claims caused by (sub-standard, STCW-certificated) 
officers is evidence of opinion in industry that the provisions of the STCW Code for officer 
competency are not sufficient to prevent casualties.375 The investigation report into the 
grounding of the chemical tanker Sichem Osprey in 2010 included a recommendation to the 
IMO: ‘To raise the minimum training level required to deliver STCW titles’.376 
Although the STCW Code contains provisions for certification requirements and for the 
use of simulators for ECDIS training, it does not adequately include express provisions 
mandating how ECDIS must be used as an aid to navigation in maintaining a safe watch. This 
research suggests that ECDIS training has not been sufficiently integrated into the STCW 
framework. A challenge faced by stakeholders in the maritime industry is to ensure that 
legislation can keep up with technological developments in navigation systems. At the 2010 
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Manila Conference of Parties to the STCW Convention, Resolution 15 was adopted – 
concerning future amendments and review of the STCW Convention and Code. Encouragingly, 
this resolution notes,  
‘that rapidly evolving technology and training methodologies require a consistent approach 
towards reviewing, amending and updating the STCW Convention and Code…’.377  
However, the resolution then states that frequent amendments should be avoided as they 
may be problematic to Maritime Administrations, shipowners, training institutions and 
seafarers. The text thus recommends that significant amendments be developed and adopted on 
a five-yearly cycle basis, with a comprehensive review of the Convention and Code carried out 
every ten years, to ensure they remain up-to-date with emerging technologies.378 If one 
considers the rapid advancements in the technological operations of electronic aids to 
navigation (particularly ECDIS and integrated systems) that have occurred over the last decade, 
this approach – while practical from an administrative perspective – hardly seems adequate.  
Part 4.1 of Chapter VIII (Part A) of the STCW Code regarding principles to be observed 
in keeping a navigational watch only contains two provisions relating specifically to ECDIS, as 
outlined in Chapter 2/II/b. While performing the watch, the code requires the OOW to make 
regular checks of the course steered, compasses, autopilot, navigational lights, radio equipment 
and UMS379 controls.380 Given that ECDIS is now the primary means of navigation on an 
increasing number of vessels, it would surely have been prudent to include a check of the 
essential safety settings and parameters of ECDIS in this provision, to draw attention to their 
importance for safe navigation. This section contains no provision warning of the dangers of 
overreliance on ECDIS or guiding officers as to how ECDIS should be used as an aid to 
navigation in maintaining a safe watch. Making both the IMO Model Course 1.27 and the 
provisions in Part B of the STCW Code regarding simulation training for ECDIS mandatory 
would help in addressing the global discrepancies encountered in ECDIS training. The 
COLREGs contain provisions for the use of radar – the time has surely come to include an 
amendment for the use of ECDIS, given the evidence of overreliance on ECDIS and AIS for 
collision avoidance.  
Recent guidance from the IMO confirms that mandatory type-specific ECDIS 
familiarisation training is not required by the STCW Code.381 The ISM and STCW Codes 
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contain provisions for familiarisation training, but in very general terms. Given that officers’ 
lack of familiarity with ECDIS has been identified as a causal factor in accidents and vessel 
detentions, there is evidently a need for (legally enforceable) international standards to clarify 
the required technical proficiencies. Both the NI and ICS have drafted comprehensive checklists 
that could be employed as templates for mandatory ECDIS familiarisation training. A practical 
assessment to demonstrate particularised competencies should be included, before an officer 
may use the ECDIS for navigation. Type-specific training should address actions to take in the 
case of failure of any integrated system components. ECDIS and GNSS-input failures should 
be drilled for regularly onboard to familiarise officers with the procedures to follow, and these 
should be included in every ECDIS-equipped vessel’s SMS.  
Resolution 7 of the STCW Manila Amendments recommends that Administrations ensure 
that shipping companies provide refresher training at suitable intervals. A requirement for 
refresher training in ECDIS (generic and type-specific) should be specified, as no such 
provision currently exists. The UK P&I Club has highlighted the loss of situational awareness 
that ECDIS can cause and has stressed the need for assessments and training renewal on ECDIS, 
as software and operating functions change with system updates.382 Refresher training would 
also help to break bad habits in the use of ECDIS, as well as address skills regression.   
Amending legislation to improve the standard and consistency of ECDIS training could 
reduce incidents of ECDIS-assisted casualties and improve navigational safety. But to be 
effective, measures to address the human factor must be deeply embedded into ECDIS 
pedagogy. Training interventions must be developed to change the attitude of navigators in their 
approach to the use of ECDIS, which is harder to achieve than teaching technical skills.  
Personal observations made while teaching generic ECDIS training courses383 – while of 
course by no means empirical research – have revealed the depth of overreliance that students 
place on ECDIS, and were part of the motivation for this dissertation topic. Students complete 
a written assessment in which they are required to articulate the hazards associated with the use 
of ECDIS, including system limitations, the dangers of overreliance, potential errors in the 
accuracy of GPS, and the need to fix position manually by an independent means. These 
students thus demonstrate theoretical knowledge of the limitations of ECDIS, but – due to 
automation bias – a percentage of them initially seem unable to apply these cautions in practice. 
When intentional errors are introduced during practical simulator exercises, some students still 
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demonstrate blind faith in flawed GPS positions and trust the ECDIS even when the radar is 
giving conflicting positional information. While additional corrective guidance is of course 
given to these candidates, the five-day generic ECDIS course as required by STCW may not be 
sufficient to address the underlying gaps in knowledge and experience of these students. 
When ECDIS training became mandatory by an STCW amendment, this training was in 
many ways ‘tacked on’ to the existing syllabus, rather than integrated into it. Traditional 
position fixing skills are still being taught in relation to paper charts – and then there is a 
separate ECDIS learning component. This may feed the impression some junior officers have 
developed that they are not required to manually fix positions on ECDIS, as they learned to fix 
on paper charts. Not integrating ECDIS into traditional navigation training also tells students 
that ECDIS operation is quick and easy to learn, indicating that the system largely thinks for 
itself with minimum input or effort required from operators.  
ECDIS must be integrated into the chartwork classes that cadets attend – when traditional 
position fixing skills are taught, these must be demonstrated on paper and electronic charts. The 
impression must not be fostered that paper and electronic charts are complete separate entities 
in terms of manual position fixing practices and requirements. Students must understand that 
anything that can be done on a paper chart can and should be done on ECDIS. Given the 
transition of the world’s fleet to paperless navigation, many students will now never use paper 
charts once working at sea. However, the principles of traditional navigation remain unchanged 
and must be instilled during ECDIS training.  
The same is true of passage planning – once students have been taught the principles, they 
should practice and demonstrate these skills on both paper charts and on ECDIS, rather than 
these being separate training activities. Case studies can be employed to illustrate the dangers 
of overreliance and emphasise the importance of correctly configuring safety parameters to 
ensure the system is supporting safe navigation as it was intended to.  
ECDIS is the integrating component of complex modern bridge systems, and the 
complexities of the use of ECDIS need to be integrated into training practices. Navigators must 
be taught how to manage the extensive information the IBS – through the ECDIS – provides 
them with. Students should be given the tools to equip them to prioritise data correctly and 
avoid information overload. The management and processing of data and information must be 
trained for, and decisions must be made using knowledge, not only information from a display 
screen.384 
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There is a strong case for additional simulator training in navigational syllabi, which 
allows instructors to assess whether students can maintain situational awareness in a modern 
bridge environment, rather than just assess their theoretical knowledge of bridge watchkeeping. 
Research has shown that well-structured simulator training can improve safety by reducing the 
occurrence of maritime casualties caused by human error, and thus reduce accident-related costs 
for shipowners and insurers.385     
The use of navigation simulators has developed to meet the training needs of the safety-
critical, high-risk operations experienced in the maritime domain.386 Recent research found that 
simulator-based training goes beyond teaching the technical proficiencies and cognitive skills 
required by STCW.387 Appropriate interventions by instructors during simulator exercises result 
in crucial corrective actions to discourage students from adopting incorrect, unsafe practices.388 
This is vital given that junior officers often acquire ‘bad habits’ learned from officers onboard, 
including short cuts, risk tolerance, overreliance and complacency in the use of electronic aids 
to navigation. Debriefing upon completion of simulation exercises is key to the learning 
process, allowing instructors the opportunity to provide detailed feedback on students’ 
performance while employing exercise replays as an effective training resource from which 
students can recognise, be held accountable for, and learn from their errors.389 Simulation 
training must include intentional errors of displayed information and failure of GNSS inputs, 
to force students to recognise errors and become proficient in plotting manual fixes on ECDIS. 
Finally, a particular challenge faced in South Africa is that due to the shortage of available 
cadet berths and junior officer employment opportunities, months or even years may elapse 
between shore-based training and shipboard employment. Inevitably, ‘skill fade’ occurs during 
this time and much of the theoretical knowledge of navigational systems is diminished. Once a 
cadet or junior officer finally finds themselves standing bridge watches, the ECDIS is ‘easier’ 
to use than the radar, and reliance is placed on ECDIS for navigational decisions without fully 
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comprehending its operation or limitations. The safety of navigation is clearly compromised in 
these circumstances and refresher training should be considered.   
  
72 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
Despite an apparently robust legal framework regulating the use of ECDIS, the current 
legislative provisions do not appear to be effective in preventing ECDIS-assisted accidents, 
particularly vessel groundings. This assertion is supported by the case studies reviewed in this 
research. These case studies also provide evidence of the unintended consequences of the 
introduction of legislation mandating the carriage of ECDIS by merchant vessels, which has in 
these cases threatened the safety of navigation. 
The significant latitude that manufacturers were allowed in interpreting the technical 
operation of ECDIS required by IMO performance standards resulted in a wide disparity in 
functionality within systems. Given the importance of manual position fixing, this function in 
particular should be consistent amongst ECDIS manufacturers. Shortcomings in the design and 
technical operational aspects of ECDIS have been identified and are being addressed through 
initiatives by parties in the maritime industry. The standardisation of systems and a focus on 
human-centred design will hopefully assist in addressing many of the challenges faced by 
officers in the use of ECDIS. Standardisation of ECDIS operational features will be 
advantageous to officers, pilots, surveyors, inspectors and accident investigators. 
Insufficient ECDIS operator knowledge and training has been identified as a causal factor 
in numerous vessel groundings.390 Current training in ECDIS as mandated by the STCW Code 
does not appear to be adequate to ensure officers’ competence in its use for safe navigation, as 
seen in the case studies. ECDIS training has not been sufficiently integrated into the STCW 
framework and express provisions mandating how ECDIS must be used as an aid to navigation 
in maintaining a safe watch should be included. Given that most maritime casualties are caused 
by human error, measures to address the human factor should be embedded into ECDIS 
pedagogy. Navigators must be taught how to manage and prioritise the extensive data the IBS 
– through the ECDIS – provides them with, to avoid information overload.  
Navigation by ECDIS is fundamentally different to paper charts due to how charted 
information is displayed. With ECDIS, the navigator controls the display by selecting which 
charted features and information are visible on the screen. Tailoring the chart display to suit the 
particular navigational situation has benefits and can enhance safety, but only if the navigator 
comprehends which charted features are appropriate to include in various circumstances. If 
navigators are inadequately trained in the use of ECDIS, they may omit safety-critical 
information from the display, or use the system at a display scale which does not show all 
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charted features required for safe navigation. It is of paramount importance that all user settings 
are appropriately configured to support navigational safety, including the display mode, display 
scale, safety contour, safety depth and guard zone. Officers disabling or ignoring automated 
ECDIS functions designed to alert them to hazards may result in the use of ECDIS decreasing 
rather than improving the safety of navigation.391 
Navigation by ECDIS and paper charts is fundamentally the same regarding the 
requirements for manual position fixing. Manual positions must be frequently plotted on 
ECDIS, as they are on paper charts. Navigators must understand the vulnerabilities of satellite-
derived GPS positional information and verify these positions by an independent means – using 
visual bearings and radar ranges and bearings during coastal navigation, and celestial fixes 
when deep-sea. The radar overlay function can be used to verify GPS information and mitigate 
overreliance on ECDIS and AIS. Although the ECDIS display may appear modern and 
therefore accurate, navigators must bear in mind that charted information may be based on older 
hydrographic survey data and should employ the CATZOC function to assess the accuracy of 
ENC data. 
Overreliance has been identified as a primary risk in the use of ECDIS, as it significantly 
reduces navigational safety. ECDIS is an aid to navigation and must be used in conjunction 
with traditional watchkeeping skills and the practices of good seamanship to ensure the safety 
of navigation. An awareness of the human factor issues associated with the human machine 
interface is required by all stakeholders in the safe navigation of merchant vessels.392 
Automation creates new error pathways and automation bias can significantly affect decision-
making. Passive watchkeeping practices of monitoring automated systems like ECDIS can 
breed complacency and pose a hazard to the safety of navigation. Instead of fulfilling its primary 
function of improving the safety of navigation, the use of ECDIS can in fact reduce situational 
awareness by distracting navigators from looking out of the bridge windows or paying attention 
to information clearly displayed on their radar screen. 
The culmination of endeavours to eradicate human error in shipping has resulted in 
autonomous vessels now looming on the navigational horizon. Despite human shortcomings, 
human agents introduce resiliency into complex automated systems and are considered an asset 
due to their ability to cognitively assess situations, exercise judgement, adapt and compensate. 
This research has found that in the case of ECDIS, the introduction of technology intended to 
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reduce human error in shipboard operations has inadvertently created new error sources. The 
advent of these types of technologically-generated error pathways may have broader 
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